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Issues and Conclusions 
#HashtagSolidarities: 
Twitter Debates and Networks in the MENA Region 
During the course of the so-called Arab Spring, observers were quick to 
refer to the uprisings as “Facebook revolutions” or “Twitter revolutions.” 
While the important role of social media in the 2011 regional upheavals in 
the Middle East and North Africa is widely acknowledged, its specific im-
pact on the protests and more generally on political processes in the 
region remains contested and contradictory. In the academic literature, 
the implications attributed to social media range from liberation technol-
ogies, which further the spread of participation and democracy, to tools 
that serve to consolidate authoritarian regimes. More recently, policy-
oriented literature has begun to discuss the role of social media, notably 
the use of Twitter, for jihadi propaganda and recruitment. In general, the 
literature provides policy makers and experts with few clues on how to 
deal with social media, be it for analysis, spreading one’s own message, or 
as a window onto important social and political developments in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. 
This study therefore takes the approach of trying to narrow the gap 
between academic insight and policy conclusions. It does not look at social 
media through a transformation or security lens, but instead seeks to 
understand how debates on important social and political topics in the 
MENA region have unfolded on Twitter to better understand ways in 
which the platform affects political debates and processes: Who drives the 
debates? What kinds of Twitter networks and digital solidarities are forged 
around these debates? To what extent do Twitter debates reflect more 
general social and political dynamics in the region? 
As a point of departure, this study identified three local or subregional 
incidents that led to heated debates on Twitter: a video shared on Twitter 
of the sexual assault of a woman on Cairo’s Tahrir Square in June 2014, 
anti-fracking protests in southern Algeria in early 2015, and Saudi Arabia’s 
military intervention in Yemen in March 2015. The three cases were 
chosen for their variety in terms of geography, content, primary language, 
degree of local freedom of expression, and local Twitter penetration. 
By closely tracing how Twitter debates on these three issues unfolded 
and conducting interviews with agenda setters for these debates, this study 
sheds light on Twitter’s role in important social and political discussions 
as well as on the scope and patterns of Twitter networks. In other words, it 
highlights the various ways Twitter is being utilized by ordinary people, 
activists, media outlets, and officials, and it provides an idea of the politi-
cal impact they can have via Twitter. Last but not least, by highlighting 
positions within these debates, the study also points to complex fault lines 
and societal developments in the MENA region little noted by Western 
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publics and policy communities. Evidence drawn from the three case studies 
allows for a number of more general conclusions to be made in regard to 
networks and agenda setters, the political functions of Twitter, and im-
plications for policy makers. 
Networks and agenda setters. First, given Twitter’s supranational nature, 
the scope and patterns of Twitter networks paradoxically have a strong 
national dimension, as the primary frame of reference for debates tends to 
be domestic. Local debates that turn transnational are quickly adapted or 
redirected to domestic contexts. A case in point is the debate on sexual 
harassment in the Maghreb sparked by the Tahrir rape incident. Second, 
where Twitter debates become transnational, they do not reflect the geo-
graphic and political frameworks policy makers tend to think in, such as 
the Gulf or the Maghreb. For instance, while there is a “Gulf space” on 
Twitter, it mainly engages Sunnis, with a “Shiite space” having different 
geographic contours. Third, language and local history play central roles 
in defining Twitter networks and their scope. For instance, the widespread 
use of French on Twitter in Algeria and Morocco, linked to the colonial his-
tory and large diaspora in France, has led to dense networks being created 
between people in France and individual Maghrebi countries and to a 
certain disconnect with networks and issues in the rest of the Arab world. 
Fourth, agenda setters in one national debate tend to be present in most 
other important domestic debates. Only a small number of actors, however 
— human rights and feminist activists, bloggers, and journalists — take 
part in region-level debates. 
Political functions of Twitter. Twitter constitutes the freest space for expres-
sion across the MENA region and remains an “asymmetric resource,” 
potentially allowing for important outcomes with little effort. It assumes 
different functions and has different effects as it grows and evolves in local 
contexts. In Algeria, with recent and low Twitter penetration and little gov-
ernment intervention, Twitter belongs almost exclusively to actors critical 
of the social and political status quo. It serves as a political infrastructure 
to build solidarities across a fragmented society and vast geographic space 
and to quickly transport and amplify events in the Algerian periphery to 
the outside world in an engaged, witty, and moderately (if at all) ideologi-
cal tenor. 
In Egypt, with a much more developed social media community but 
tight media censorship and curbs on civil liberties, Twitter constitutes a 
space for highly politicized, often aggressive mobilization both for and 
against the regime of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. It also stands as the rare remain-
ing arena for voicing dissent and building transnational solidarities among 
human rights activists. In Saudi Arabia — which has the region’s highest 
Twitter penetration but also the regime most sophisticated in using new 
technologies for its own purposes — pro-regime and conservative voices 
dominate the discourse. The debate on the Saudi intervention in Yemen 
reflects identity politics and exemplifies how hate discourse largely 
muzzles moderate voices and how Twitter contributes to enhancing deep 
sectarian fault lines in the Arab East and the Gulf. 
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Implications for European policy makers. It is difficult if not impossible to 
generalize the often ambivalent role of Twitter in political and societal 
processes. Even if Twitter debates and networks do not trigger or predict 
political developments, they are nonetheless seismographs of a sort: They 
allow for the identification of rumblings of local grievances as well as 
politicized spaces of solidarity and propaganda that could translate into 
political action and affect political and societal dynamics. Such insights 
have a number of implications for European policy makers. 
First, policy makers tend to think primarily in terms of how to use 
Twitter for their own messaging purposes. If they want to do this success-
fully, they need to understand Twitter dynamics and networks and ulti-
mately the dreams and traumas of local societies. This also implies taking 
an interest in important local voices on Twitter, in whatever the language, 
and making note of the growing role diaspora communities play in 
Twitter debates relevant to their home country. Second, while Twitter’s 
role in processes of radicalization and polarization deserves more atten-
tion by both researchers and policy makers, the focus on potentially 
negative security-related effects should not infringe on Twitter’s positive 
social and political functions. Twitter may not be the liberation technology 
that brings more revolution and ultimately democratization to the Arab 
world, but it has an important function as one of the last spaces of (rela-
tively) free expression, discussion, and network building for civil and 
political rights–oriented activists in the Arab world. Preventing the further 
curbing of internet freedoms should be an important priority in any nego-
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The Role of Twitter in the MENA Region 
Mareike Transfeld and Isabelle Werenfels 
Social media have been attributed an almost mythical role in the so-called 
Arab Spring. Indeed, the wave of popular protests demanding dignity and 
freedom across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region was sparked 
by a local event strongly amplified by social media networks. When in 
December 2010 the young Tunisian Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on 
fire in Sidi Bouzid to protest humiliation by the police, news of the inci-
dent and videos of subsequent protests in the small Tunisian town spread 
via social media before finding its way into mainstream media, namely, 
Al Jazeera. On Twitter, information about the incident was first shared 
under the hashtag #bouazizi (the person), later under #sidibouzid (the 
town), and then under #tunisia (the country). The evolution of the hash-
tags illustrates how news traveled from the local level to the national and 
international arenas through social media networks, defying state censor-
ship, circumventing a national media blackout, and contributing to popu-
lar mobilization that ultimately resulted in the overthrow of Zine El 
Abidine Ben Ali on 14 January 2011.1 As in Tunisia, in other Arab countries 
experiencing major upheaval, “the inciting incidents of the Arab Spring 
were digitally mediated in some way.”2 
Yet, some terms, including “Twitter revolution,” which first popped up 
in analyses of the 2009 post-election protests in Iran, have rightly been 
called into question as being overly “techno-utopian.”3 Indeed, strongly 
positive framings of the effects of social media are deceptive, because 
social media are not only being employed by those seeking more liberties 
and promoting human rights, but also by those trying to curb them — that 
is, authoritarian regimes that use these platforms for surveillance and re-
pression, as in the case of Egypt and Saudi Arabia.4 Authoritarian regimes 
(such as Saudi Arabia) that have expanded national internet penetration 
have also put in place the most severe censorship protocols. In fact, a 
positive correlation between internet penetration and democratization in 
 
1  See Anita Breuer, Todd Landman, and Dorothea Farquhar, “Social Media and Protest 
Mobilization: Evidence from the Tunisian Revolution,” Democratization 22, no. 4 (2015): 
764–92. 
2  Muzammah M. Huassain and Philip N. Howard, “What Best Explains Successful Protest 
Cascades? ICTs and Fuzzy Causes of the Arab Spring,” International Studies Review 15, no. 64 
(2013). 
3  Christian Christensen, “Discourses of Technology and Liberation: State Aid to Net Activ-
ists in an Era of ‘Twitter Revolutions,’” Communication Review 14, no. 3 (2011): 234. 
4  See, for instance, Orlit Perlov and Yoel Guzansky, The Social Media Discourse in Saudi 
Arabia: The Conservative and Radical Camps Are the Dominant Voices, INSS Insight 511/2014 (Tel 
Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 5 February 2014); Espen Geelmuyden Rod 
and Nils B. Weidmann, “Empowering Activists or Autocrats: The Internet in Authoritarian 
Regimes,” Journal of Peace Research 13 (2015). 
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the MENA region cannot be substantiated.5 Moreover, those pushing for 
liberties may well sit far from the countries where citizens are protesting. 
In the Iranian case, American journalists contributed significantly to 
promoting the protests of 2009 on Twitter.6 Last but not least, non-state 
actors active on Twitter have vastly differing visions of politics and society. 
They may defend repressive regimes, like that of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in 
Egypt, or they might propagate jihad and use social media for recruitment 
purposes, as with the Islamic State.7 
Given these diverse and contradictory interests pursued via Twitter and 
other social media, the ways in which social media networks constitute a 
new “political infrastructure”8 and affect political processes are diverse 
and complicated, and the outcomes are often contradictory and difficult to 
generalize. The plethora of models on the political impact of information 
and communication technologies in general and of social media in 
particular reflect the ongoing academic struggle for grasping if and how 
these new technologies and networks change politics.9 Efforts to predict 
political outcomes based on social media analyses have produced interest-
ing insights based on specific cases. For instance, they have demonstrated 
how the use, spread, and polarization of hashtags in Egypt preceded strong 
social and political tensions.10 Yet, in other cases, Twitter activity did not 
 
5  Geelmuyden Rod and Weidmann, “Empowering Activists or Autocrats”; Sara A. New-
land and Peter Lorentzen, “Countering Liberation Technology: Internet Access and Media 
Freedom in Autocracies,” 24 June 2015, http://peterlorentzen.com/research_files/ 
Newland_Lorentzen_Media.pdf (accessed 4 January 2016). 
6  Evgeny Morozov, “Iran: Downside to the ‘Twitter Revolution,’” Dissent 56, no. 4 (2009): 
10–14. 
7  J. M. Berger and Jonathan Morgan, The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the 
Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter, Analysis Paper 20/2015, Brookings Project on U.S. 
Relations with the Islamic World (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, March 2015, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/isis-twitter-census-berger- 
morgan/isis_twitter_census_berger_morgan.pdf (accessed 4 January 2016). 
8  Asiem El Difraoui and Leoni Abel, “The Web 2.0 Revolution and Arab Revolutionaries: 
The Role of the New Media as Political Infrastructure in the Arab World,” in Deutsche Welle 
Media Dialogue 2012: The Arab World. The Role of Media in the Arab World’s Transformation Process 
(Berlin: Vistas), https://www.academia.edu/5486909/_with_Leoni_Abel_The_Web_2.0_ 
Revolution_and_ArabRevolutionaies._The_role_of_the_new_media_as_political_infrastruc 
ture_in_the_Arab_World (accessed 4 January 2016). 
9  See, for instance, Archon Fung, Hollie Russon Gilman, and Jennifer Shkabatur, “Six 
Models for the Internet + Politics,” International Studies Review 15, no. 1 (2013): 30–47; J. P. 
Singh, “Information Technologies, Meta-Power and Transformations in Global Politics,” 
International Studies Review 15, no. 1 (2013): 5–29. 
10  See, for instance, Hal Hodson, “Twitter Hashtags Predict Rising Tension in Egypt,” New 
Scientist, 21 August 2013, http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21929315.500-twitter-
hashtags-predict-rising-tension-in-egypt.html#.VSvwGmPLaPU (accessed 4 January 2016); 
Ingmar Weber, Venkata R. Kiran Garimella, and Alaa Batayneh, “Secular vs. Islamist 
Polarization in Egypt on Twitter” (paper presented at the IEEE/ACM International Confer-
ence on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining, 2013), http://www.qcri.com/ 
app/media/1900 (accessed 4 January 2016). Studies from other regions of the world in-
dicate that pre-election sentiment on Twitter may be indicative of results. See Andranik 
Tumasjan et al., “Election Forecasts with Twitter: How 140 Characters Reflect the Political 
Landscape,” Social Science Computer Review 29 (2010): 402–18. 
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precede upheaval, but increased after sustained protests. Thus, findings 
from case studies so far have often been difficult to translate into more 
generally applicable theories. 
The aim of this study is comparatively modest in that it focuses on only 
one social medium, Twitter, and does not try to construct a meta-theory. It 
seeks to better understand ways in which Twitter is used in local political 
and social debates and processes through micro-level analyses of how three 
debates in the MENA region unfolded in regard to Twitter networks and 
the positions taken. The study first focuses on actors and networks in-
volved in “real life” events: Who are the influential players in the debates? 
What efforts are made toward mobilization? What digital solidarities 
emerge? How does Twitter relate to traditional media? How do the debates 
spread geographically? How does the choice of language — i.e., Arabic, 
English, or French — affect network patterns? The study then moves on to 
the content of the Twitter debates themselves to analyze the spectrum of 
positions taken, the fault lines that emerge, and how the Twitter debates 
interact with or affect local politics. Based on these insights, the study 
then seeks to draw conclusions beyond the individual case studies to look 
for more general patterns of Twitter debates and networks in the MENA 
region and their possible implications for local politics. By focusing on 
new spaces of political articulation in which “ordinary people” strive to 
generate change and shape politics, rather than on political institutions or 
formal political actors, this study places itself within the larger political 
science current on street politics.11 
Why Twitter? 
Twitter was chosen as the main prism for analysis for several reasons. First, 
Twitter as a social media platform is an open and public space in contrast, 
for instance, to Facebook, which is a social network consisting of a com-
plicated web of mostly closed and private spaces.12 Twitter’s openness also 
facilitates network analysis. Second, Twitter allows for chronological ex-
amination of how a debate unfolds from the very first tweet on a specific 
event. Moreover, Twitter — due to its retweeting function, references to 
other users in tweets, and tracking of numbers and nature of followers — 
permits identification of so-called influencers, or agenda setters, in a 
debate. Third, Twitter penetration is growing in the MENA region and is 
 
11  For this area of research as well for more on the category of “ordinary people,” see for 
instance, Asef Bayat, Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010). 
12  The delineation between social media (e.g., Twitter) and social networks (e.g., Face-
book) is often fuzzy, even in academic literature. Yet the distinction is relevant as the two 
have different functions. On social media, users create communities with a primary goal 
of sharing information. Facebook’s main aim is to foster or create relationships, be it for 
private or business purposes. See also Pete Schauer, “Five Biggest Differences between 
Social Media and Social Networking,” Social Media Today, 28 June 2015, http://www. 
socialmediatoday.com/social-business/peteschauer/2015-06-28/5-biggest-differences-between-
social-media-and-social#sthash.VM7FELFu.dpuf (accessed 17 February 2016). 
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likely to continue to do so. Though reliable information on the exact num-
ber of current Twitter users in the MENA region is hard to come by, there 
are indicators both to the number of accounts and their geographic 
spread. 
An Arab Social Media report estimated the region’s Twitter universe in 
March 2014 at 5,797,500 users. An average of 17,198,900 tweets per day 
were sent from the Arab world — 40 percent from Saudi Arabia; 17 percent 
from Egypt, and 10 percent from Kuwait.13 Agenda setters interviewed for 
this study in or from Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and 
Yemen indicated in 2015 that judging from their followers, their respec-
tive local or national communities were growing impressively. 
Given the overall modest number of users, any analysis of Twitter must 
confront the issue of representation in regard to actors and content. Who 
is actually speaking on Twitter? What segments of society are represented? 
How broad is the spectrum of positions reflected on Twitter? To what 
extent are Twitter debates representative of debates in and concerns of 
local societies given that an overwhelming majority of people in the Arab 
world does not use Twitter? 
While such questions and concerns are justified, they are not material 
to the goal and purpose of this study, as it claims to be representative only 
in the ways in which the three events were discussed on Twitter. Yet, 
analysis of the three events also indicates that the content spread through 
Twitter, at least in the MENA region, tends to be far broader than might be 
expected based on the number of Twitter users and their backgrounds. 
Indeed, those persons active on Twitter numerically represent a very 
small part of their societies. For instance, in the Maghreb less than 1 per-
cent of the population has a Twitter account. Moreover, Twitter not only 
requires internet access, but also Twitter literacy, that is, an aptitude for 
sharing and commenting on sometimes complex political, social, economic, 
and cultural issues in a message of only 140 characters. Hence, Twitter 
users are generally among the better-educated members of society. 
Although those active on Twitter tend to be the more educated, this has 
no bearing on the spectrum of opinions, which is remarkably broad. For 
one, despite increasing censorship and official counter-propaganda, Twit-
ter according to users from across the Arab world still constitutes the 
freest space for expression in the MENA region.14 Moreover, opinions ex-
 
13  Racha Mourtada, Fadi Salem, and Sarah Al-Shaer, Citizen Engagement and Public Services in 
the Arab World: The Potential of Social Media, Arab Social Media Report, 6th ed., June 2014, http:// 
www.mbrsg.ae/getattachment/e9ea2ac8-13dd-4cd7-9104-b8f1f405cab3/Citizen-Engagement-
and-Public-Services-in-the-Arab.aspx (accessed 4 January 2016). The Arab Social Media 
Report of 2014 provided the most reliable freely accessible number of Twitter users to 
date. In May 2015, however, the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information in Cairo 
put forward substantially higher estimates for Twitter users mainly in the Maghreb coun-
tries. See Gamal Eid, et al., “#Turn_Around_and_Go_Back: Internet in the Arab World,” 
Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, Cairo, p. 9. http://anhri.net/?p=144031& 
lang=en&lang=en.  
14  Interviews with Twitter influencers in or from Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Tuni-
sia, and Yemen. A six-country study by Northwestern University in Qatar found that 26 
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pressed by people who do not use Twitter are nonetheless represented on 
Twitter. Twitter is a social space “where information, ideas, values, and 
subjectivities are contested between (uneven) adversaries”15 and where 
users are strongly “exposed to multiple, diverse points of view through the 
public timeline.”16 Most articles, radio programs, and television segments 
relevant to a debate are found in links on Twitter. With tweets containing 
links to blogs, websites, international newspapers as well as visual and 
audio material often not available through or allowed by traditional media 
outlets, the spectrum of information available on Twitter far exceeds that 
of other local and international media. The three debates highlighted in 
this study testify to this, albeit to different degrees. 
Twitter as a Tool and a Pool: Methodological Challenges 
Despite Twitter’s multiple assets, any research faces substantial methodo-
logical challenges when seeking to use Twitter as a tool for analysis by 
tapping into the social medium’s vast pool of information. This study con-
fronted the following issues. 
 Accessing Twitter data. Twitter restricts access to its data. Open source on-
line applications only allow downloading through the streaming appli-
cation program interface, or API,17 which constitutes 1 percent of all 
Twitter data. The criteria according to which this 1 percent is produced 
are not transparent, and the representativeness of the sample is not 
always made available.18 Access to historical data (older than eighteen 
days) is impossible using this method. Access to comprehensive data sets 
requires purchases of data through retailers. 
 
percent of users interviewed considered Twitter unsafe, while 62 percent viewed Face-
book as unsafe. Viber, YouTube, and WhatsApp were thought to be less safe than Twitter. 
See Media Use in the Middle East, 2015: A Six-Nation Survey by Northwestern University 
in Qatar, “Social Media: Sharing Information and Connecting Online Nearly Universal,” 
http://www.mideastmedia.org/2015/chapter/social-media.html#subchapter0 (accessed 4 Janu-
ary 2016). 
15  Babak Rahimi, “The Agonistic Social Media: Cyberspace in the Formation of Dissent 
and Consolidation of State Power in Postelection Iran,” Communication Review 14, no. 3 
(2011): 158–78. 
16  Sarita Yardi and Danah Boyd, “Dynamic Debates: An Analysis of Group Polarization 
over Time on Twitter,” Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society, no. 30 (2010): 316. 
17  Streaming API is an application that allows the instantaneous and or continuous 
downloading of a live Twitter stream. For more background information, see Twitter, 
“The Streaming APIs Overview,” https://dev.twitter.com/streaming/overview (accessed 18 
January 2016). 
18  The comparison of streaming API data and manually extracted data from the Twitter 
firehose — direct extraction from the Twitter stream without mediation through an 
application — for the Algeria case study revealed that the API data largely contained 
tweets that were not retweeted. In other words, via the API, it would have been extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to identify influential tweets and agenda setters. See Fred 
Morstatter, Jürgen Pfeffer, and Huan Liu, “When Is It Biased? Assessing the Representa-
tiveness of Twitter’s Streaming API,” International World Wide Web Conference 
Committee, Seoul, 7–11 April 2014, http://www2014.kr/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/ 
companion_p555.pdf (accessed 4 January 2016). 
The Role of Twitter in the MENA Region 
SWP Berlin 
Twitter Debates and Networks  




 Filtering data relevant to the research question. With an average of 500 billion 
tweets sent on a daily basis from various locations around the world, 
and with many of them dealing with lifestyle issues, it is challenging to 
filter out “Arab debates” on sociopolitical issues. One method for locat-
ing such traffic is by filtering languages. Although, it allows for finding a 
majority of tweets written in a particular language, it cannot identify  
a debate geographically.19 The use of language varies greatly across 
countries and depending on the issue debated.20 Moreover, as Twitter is 
a transregional and transcontinental platform, searching with keywords 
or hashtags such as #Lebanon, #Egypt or #MENA will bring to light a 
plethora of debates but not necessarily local Arab debates. 
 Identifying account locations. Theoretically, Arab debates can be filtered by 
identifying users’ location through Twitter’s advanced search option.21 
Yet, the results are highly unreliable, because only 1 percent of all tweets 
are geotagged. Relevant data regarding location thus is not available as a 
filter. That not all Twitter users provide their location in self-descrip-
tions on their profiles is an additional obstacle to identifying and map-
ping geographic networks of users in a debate. 
 Locating communities relevant to a debate. Despite its transregional and 
transcontinental character, Twitter is fragmented into different and 
unique communities. This presents a challenge because identifying dif-
ferent positions and cleavages in a debate, one of the goals in content 
analysis here, requires taping into a variety of the communities. 
 Deciphering Twitter slang. Regardless of the language used in a tweet, it 
tends to be abbreviated and contains local dialects, allusions, and refer-
ences. Hence, decoding tweets often requires prodigious understanding 
of local sociocultural and sociopolitical contexts.22 
 
19  In March 2014, 75 percent of tweets from the Arab world were written in Arabic, 16 
percent in English, and 9 percent in other languages. See Mourtada, Salem, and Al-Shaer, 
Citizen Engagement and Public Services in the Arab World, 38. 
20  Ibid., 39. See also Axel Bruns, Tim Highfield, and Jean Burgess, “The Arab Spring and 
Social Media Audiences: English and Arabic Twitter Users and Their Networks,” American 
Behavioral Scientist 57, no. 7 (2013): 871–98. 
21  See Kalev H. Leetaru et al., “Mapping the Global Twitter Heartbeat: The Geography of 
Twitter,” First Monday 18, no. 5 (2013), http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/ 
view/4366/3654 (accessed 4 January 2016). 
22  So-called bots — that is automated, or automatically generated, Twitter accounts, 
which retweet or spread (mass) messages — can pose a problem for Twitter analysis 
depending on the research question. In the samples of this study, they were found in the 
debate on the military intervention in Yemen. See the section “Saudi Intervention in 
Yemen: Domestic Lens and Regional Solidarity, #OpDecisiveStorm.” For the purpose of 
understanding how a debate evolves, they did not present a challenge, as they were an 
integral part of the debate reality and of the measures used by the pro-Saudi camp to 
dominate the debate. As this study also has a qualitative dimension, bots and human 
accounts could be identified in most cases, among other things based on their profiles 
and their tweeting behavior. 
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Circumventing the Methodological Challenges 
Without standard methods for conducting research on Twitter data in the 
literature, the research for this study proceeded in an eclectic and explora-
tive way. To circumvent or minimize the above inherent challenges, the 
research was conducted as follows. 
Three local or subregional events that led to heated debates on Twitter 
were selected for tracking: a rape on Cairo’s Tahrir Square in June 2014, 
anti-fracking protests in southern Algeria in winter and spring 2015, and 
Saudi Arabia’s military operation in Yemen in spring 2015.23 The choice of 
the three cases was deliberately broad in terms of the nature and impact of 
the triggering event to encompass varying patterns of how Twitter debates 
unfold. The decision to focus on local events allowed for identification of a 
clear timeframe as well as keywords to filter and reduce data. Of most 
importance, Twitter debates that initially took place within local Arab 
Twitter communities could be discerned. 
To find the broadest possible spectrum of voices in the three debates, 
general, recurrent keywords in tweets about the three events were targeted. 
Hashtags were avoided because they tend to be indicative of a certain 
position; competing publics resort to different hashtags. Users not identify-
ing with a camp may use a neutral or non-descript hashtag or none at all, 
and thus may not be found in a sample search based on hashtags.24 These 
terms were searched in at least two languages (i.e., Arabic and English, 
Arabic and French), and for some debates, in three languages (Arabic, Eng-
lish, and French). This allowed for finding debates on these events in the pri-
mary languages used. Tweets written in local dialect were included in the 
samples if they contained the search terms in one of the languages cited. 
In the second step, tweets that were retweeted a certain number of 
times were identified for transfer to the research database. Doing so 
allowed for the identification of tweets (i.e., content) deemed important by 
other participants in the debate and users who wielded a certain influence 
in the discussion.25 The threshold for the minimum number of retweets 
differed for the three debates, because the size of the Twitter communities, 
and thus the data volume, varied from case to case. A tweet on or from 
 
23  A fourth case, a controversy over the use of dialect versus Standard Arabic in the 
Moroccan education system, was also analyzed. As the debate remained primarily Moroc-
can, it was not pursued as a case study. Some insights and patterns from that debate and 
networks are, however, discussed in the “Beyond the Individual Twitter Debate.” 
24  Hashtags are used to signal membership in a community, to track ongoing debates, 
and to communicate non-verbal cues. They emerge from the Twitter community spon-
taneously as well as pre-planned, sometimes out of consensus and after prolonged delib-
eration. For instance, in Morocco a blogger announced the exact date of the beginning of 
a campaign critical of the Moroccan education system and introduced the hashtag 
#EducMa. See “Les tweeps marocains débattent de l’education,” http://houdac.blogspot.de/ 
2011/03/les-tweeps-marocains-debattent-de.html (accessed 4 January 2016). 
25  For more on the concept and identification of influencers, see Eytan Bakshy et al., 
“Identifying ‘Influencers’ on Twitter,” conference paper, http://www.researchgate.net/ 
publication/52003758_Identifying_’Influencers’_on_Twitter (accessed 4 January 2016). 
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Saudi Arabia might receive thousands of retweets, while in the Maghreb, a 
hundred retweets could be considered extraordinary. 
The third step consisted of identifying the geographic location of Twit-
ter accounts. This was done manually for lack of access to software that 
allows tracing locations beyond information openly accessible and the 
desire not to obtain such software for ethical reasons.26 In some cases, in-
formation on location was provided in profiles or on a related blog or Face-
book page. In other cases, reading dozens of tweets in combination with 
information related to time zones allowed assumptions to be made to a 
high degree of certainty as to a user’s location. Sometimes clear evidence 
of a city was found. In a minority of cases, the search was inconclusive. 
The data set gathered for each case study involved a minimum of 600 
tweets and did not exceed 1,200. This provided the basis for software-
driven network analysis with the freeware NodeXL27 as well as for a quali-
tative analysis of the content of the tweets.28 The focus of the network 
analysis was largely on the main actors within the debates, on the geo-
graphic scope of the networks, on network patterns according to the lan-
guage used, on polarization between groups in a debate, and on the inter-
play of individual users and media accounts. 
Qualitative analysis consisted of first identifying the main recurring argu-
ments and narratives in the Twitter discussions and coding each tweet 
accordingly. Links and attached visual material were also examined. The 
breadth of arguments and material found on Twitter were then compared 
to traditional media debates on the three events. Where relevant, cross-
media dynamics were identified, namely, how information traveled between 
Twitter accounts of journalists and traditional media, nationally and inter-
nationally. 
Finally, interviews were sought with agenda setters for the different 
debates about their use of Twitter, their input in the debates, and their 
general foci of interest on Twitter, geographically and in terms of issues. 
Criteria employed to identify agenda setters included the following: dis-
playing a high level of activity in the debate; garnering a certain amount 
of retweets or mentions; having a presence in other important local 
debates; constituting an important node (a person with a high degree of 
 
26  Linking data gathered through social media, internet browsers, various applications, 
and mobile phones allows for the identification of individuals along with their interests, 
movements, purchases, and contacts. This represents an extraordinary invasion of privacy. 
We believe that research conducted with or on social media for academic or policy purposes 
should adhere to research ethics, that is, only using data that is publicly available. 
27  NodeXL is an open source network analysis and visualization software developed by 
the Social Media Research Foundation. Among others, it was used by Pew Research Center 
to conduct their 2014 research on Twitter networks. See “How We Analyzed Twitter 
Social Media Networks with NodeXL,” http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2014/02/How-we-
analyzed-Twitter-socia l-media-networks. pdf (accessed 4 January 2016). 
28  For information, see “NodeXL: Network Overview, Discovery and Exploration for 
Excel,” https://nodexl.codeplex.com (accessed 4 January 2016). The software-driven map-
ping of networks was done in cooperation with SWP’s Knowledge and Information Manage-
ment division, in particular with its head, Robert Strötgen. 
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connectivity) in a network; and serving as an important bridge between 
networks or regions. 
Although all three case studies were approached in the same way, diffi-
culties and opportunities linked to the amount of data produced in the 
different debates led to different foci, especially in the network analysis, as 
well as divergences in methodology. For instance, in the case of fracking in 
Algeria, due to the limited number of tweets in the overall debate, it was 
possible to analyze it over a longer period of time and to focus on micro-
dynamics among individual, collective (parties, movements, etc.), and 
media accounts. The Saudi and Egyptian cases, due to the thousands of 
tweets gathered from the first hours and days alone and the huge number 
of retweets, allowed for discerning users with a significant individual im-
pact on the debates as well as mapping larger networks.29 
 
 
29  Differences in approach also emerged in regard to the visual mapping of the events. 
Because of the comparatively small amount of data and relatively low activity of the 
Algerian Twitter community, it was possible to identify all the relevant tweets in the 
debate as well as to download enough data through NodeXL (which permits the down-
load of the 5,200 most recent tweets of an account) to cover almost the entire time period 
during which the protests took place. Due to the high degree of activity by the Egyptian 
Twitter community, and because the time between downloading tweets and the event 
itself was relatively long, it was impossible to gather Twitter user data from the time of 
the Tahrir rape incident itself, for instance. 
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The Sexual Harassment Debate in Egypt: 
Impacting Discourses and Pressuring the State 
in a Polarized Society, #Tahrir_Taharrush 
Mareike Transfeld 
The widespread perception of Twitter’s democratizing and revolutionary 
potential was significantly shaped by the pictures of the protests in Janu-
ary 2011 on Cairo’s Tahrir Square that circulated globally on Facebook, 
Twitter, and satellite television. The role that Twitter plays in Egyptian 
society and politics is, however, more nuanced than initial impressions 
might suggest. These nuances were revealed by a debate sparked 8 June 
2014, with the appearance of a YouTube video documenting the rape of a 
woman on Tahrir Square during Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s presidential inaugu-
ration. The video instantly spread on social media, including Twitter, and 
then found its way into traditional media. 
The ensuing Twitter debate on sexual harassment and violence not only 
reflected the polarization of Egyptian society as a result of a prolonged po-
litical power struggle, it also mirrored a larger debate on sexuality and 
pointed to the differing perceptions of Egyptians about their nation and 
people as well as their positions on security and freedoms. The debate ex-
emplified how Egyptians were using Twitter and sheds a light on national 
virtual social networks. Twitter played an important role in mobilizing 
against sexual harassment and in forcing political, social, and traditional 
media actors to take a stand on the issue. At the same time, it served as in-
frastructure for a transnational anti-sexual harassment movement. These 
insights are important for understanding the potential of Twitter’s impact 
on societal and political developments in Egypt and beyond. 
In March 2014, Egypt had 1,090,000 Twitter accounts, making it the 
second largest Twitter universe in the Arab world, after Saudi Arabia. 
Seventeen percent of all tweets from Arab countries originated from Egypt. 
In the region, Twitter became popular in Egypt early on. Established in 
2006, the microblogging platform had attracted attention in the country 
in 2008 when an American journalism student used his mobile phone to 
tweet about his arrest after photographing anti-government protests in the 
city of Mahalla.1 
Egypt’s Twitter community consequently developed on the back of 
emerging anti-government sentiment and an already politicized Egyptian 
blogosphere. Online space had previously been found for expressing politi-
cal dissent during the second Palestinian intifada (2000–2005), and espe-
 
1  Mallory Simon, “Student ‘Twitters’ His Way Out of Egyptian Jail,” CNN, 25 April 2008, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/TECH/04/25/twitter.buck/index.html?eref=onion (accessed 6 
January 2016). 
Network Dynamics of the Sexual Harassment Debate on Twitter 
SWP Berlin 
Twitter Debates and Networks  




cially during the 2004/05 Kefaya movement in Egypt.2 Consequently, 
citizen journalists and activists resorted to blogs and video platforms (pri-
marily YouTube), and later Facebook and Twitter, to highlight police 
violence and document anti-government protests. These developments 
prepared Egyptians to use social media, in particular Twitter, for political 
dissent as witnessed during the January 25 Revolution. After 2011, activists 
and journalists continued to use Twitter for various purposes. 
Today, under the Sisi government, the monitoring of social media has 
increased, and young activists have been arrested for material they have 
shared online. In October 2015, Amr Nohan, a Facebook user, was charged 
with “attempting to overthrow the regime” and sentenced to three years 
prison for posting a picture of Sisi with Mickey Mouse ears.3 In response to 
Nohan’s sentencing, the image for which he was convicted spread widely 
on Twitter, with thousands expressing their support for the young man. In 
November 2015, the April 6 Youth Movement launched an anti-Sisi hash-
tag that became widely used to express discontent with the president.4 
Most traditional media put forward the positions of the Sisi government, 
as oppositional media, especially that sympathetic to the Muslim Brother-
hood, was shut down after the overthrow of President Mohammed Mursi 
in 2013. Hence, Twitter remained a rare and important space for individu-
als to voice critical opinions. Nevertheless, with numerous arrests of activ-
ists and journalists, self-censorship has increased in Egypt.5 
Network Dynamics of the Sexual Harassment Debate on Twitter 
The Twitter debate about the June 2014 rape incident on Tahrir Square 
took place in Arabic and English. To analyze the immediate reactions on 
Twitter and delineate the networks, the keywords harassment (taharrush in 
Arabic)6 and Tahrir were searched in English to collect the first tweets 
between the afternoon of 8 June until midnight the following day in 
reference to the incident. From the many thousand of tweets in English 
and Arabic containing these words, those with five or more retweets were 
extracted to identify the more influential tweets and users in the debate. 
The sample collected contained 511 tweets in Arabic and 153 in English. 
 
2  Nadine Abdalla, “Social Media and the Egyptian Revolution,” Perspectives on European 
Security: STETE Year Book 2011, (Helsinki: Finnish Committee for European Security), 70–73. 
3  Mona Daoud, “Jailed for Putting Mickey Mouse Ears on Sisi?,” CairoScene, 20 October 
2015, http://www.cairoscene.com/BusinessAndPolitics/Jailed-for-Putting-Mickey-Mouse-Ears- 
on-Sisi (accessed 6 January 2016). 
4  “Egyptians Launch Anti-Sisi Twitter Campaign,” Middle East Monitor, 18 November 2015, 
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/africa/22351-egyptians-launch-anti-sisi-twitter-
campaign (accessed 6 January 2016). 
5  See Freedom House, “Freedom on the Net: Egypt,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/ 
freedom-net/2015/egypt (accessed 6 January 2016). 
6  The word harassment (taharrush) was used rather than the word rape (ightisab), because 
issues relating to different forms of sexual harassment and violence tend to be discussed 
under the term harassment rather than rape, with the most common hashtags containing 
the former term. 
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Most of the users in the Arabic sample were based in Cairo, followed by 
those in Alexandria. Some users tweeting in Arabic were found to be based 
in the diaspora in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Gulf states, par-
ticularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, two countries with large Twitter com-
munities and Egyptian immigrant populations.7 Many of those tweeting in 
Arabic were activists, bloggers, and journalists, but an overwhelming num-
ber in the Arabic sample did not disclose their profession. 
The sample of English tweets included Egyptians and non-Egyptians, 
who are spread farther geographically than those in the Arabic sample. 
While the majority came from Cairo, a large number were based in the 
United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the Gulf states, and Lebanon. 
It is striking that the overwhelming majority of English-language tweeters 
provided thorough self-descriptions in which they identified themselves by 
profession. The bulk of these users were foreign correspondents for US or 
British media or American, European, or Middle Eastern political analysts 
and commentators based in various Middle Eastern states as well as Western 
countries. 
The English and Arabic debates formed separate spheres of tight-knit 
networks because of a language barrier (see Figure 1). Figure 1 shows the 
general network contours and the sustained connectedness of the users at a 
random point in time after the sexual harassment debate. This suggests high 
levels of interaction within and between international and local networks 
over longer periods of time. While Western media informed the English 
sphere, the Arabic sphere spread Egyptian media links. While the Arabic-
language sphere was much more focused on discussing societal problems 
in Egypt and exhibited more political polarization and emotional language, 
the general themes in the sexual harassment debate were similar in both 
language spheres. A small group of Egyptian bloggers and activists tweet-
ing in both languages served as bridges between the two language spheres, 
transferring information and sentiments from one network to the other. 
Many of them have become influential on Twitter due to their connections 
with activists on the ground as well as local and international media. 
Societal Fault Lines and Social Debates: 
Governance, Nation, and Sexuality 
Although the Tahrir rape incident attracted attention on Twitter across 
the region and in the West, Egyptians and foreign journalists and experts 
who already had an eye on Egyptian affairs dominated the debate. It was 
first and foremost an Egyptian discussion. The sample analyzed shows the 
strong emotional reaction of Twitter users to the video of the incident. 
Many users were outraged and disgusted, turning to vulgar language and 
 
 
7  International Organization for Migration, “A Study on the Dynamics of the Egyptian 
Diaspora: Strengthening Development Linkages,” Cairo, July 2010, 17, http://www.egypt. 
iom.int/Doc/A%20Study%20on%20the%20Dynamics%20of%20the%20Egyptian%20Diaspora% 
20% 28English%29.pdf (accessed 7 June 2015). 
The rape of a #Woman is 
#Terrorism. Treat it as 
such. Prosecute it as such. 
Protect the dignity of the 













































            
Explanation: 
 Time frame: dominant users collected in the timeframe of 8–9 June 2014. 
 Visualizes interactions (mentions/replies) among 117 dominant users’; 1,305 tweets,  
1 January–31 March 2015 regardless of whether there is a link to sexual harassment.* 
 Size of nodes: Large nodes indicate that a user has significant influence on the entire network,  
so-called eigenvector centrality. 
 Arrows: Indicate that a node mentioned or replied at least once to the node to which the  
arrow points. Interaction in both directions results in an arrow with two heads. 
 
*  As only a total amount of 5200 of the most recent tweets of any user can be 
downloaded with NodeXL, the period of analysis was too far back in time to  
be able to visualise the interaction between users during the time of the sexual 
harassment debate. The visualisation nevertheless shows important dynamics 
between the English and Arabic language spheres. 
Figure 1 
Interactions among Arabic- and English-Tweeting Dominant Users from the Sexual Harassment Debate 
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cursing to express themselves. Although the debate was sparked by the 
video of a specific attack, it quickly developed into a broader discussion 
touching on various themes relevant to Egyptians. 
At the time the video was spread, Twitter users were already discussing a 
new sexual harassment law. The video was spread therefore in a context 
where sexual harassment was already being addressed, while the environ-
ment was highly politicized. Inherent to this discussion were perceptions 
of security and freedoms as well as a general critique of security govern-
ance. In this regard, the debate revealed fault lines between citizens and 
the government, particularly between citizens and the police. Many users 
called for government action and asked how sexual violence on the street 
was possible given the strong presence of the police and military. Others 
called for firm implementation of the sexual harassment law, while others 
criticized the legislation for its leniency. Users also connected the discus-
sion to the debate on police brutality that had been a catalyst for the 2011 
protests.8 Security apparatus members had been accused of using sexual 
harassment and rape as a strategy for repression, and Twitter users made 
reference to the so-called virginity tests to which military personnel sub-
jected female activists in 2011.9 
The nation serves as one of the main frames of reference in the sexual 
harassment discussion, with this particular incident being seen as 
bringing shame to the Egyptian nation. In the context of the debate, 
positive characteristics associated with the Egyptian people, such as great-
ness and natural piousness, were brought into question. This is of rele-
vance because the people (ash-sha’ab) became a loaded term in a positive sense 
during the 2011 uprising. The negative assessment of Egypt and its people 
after word spread of the rape came to juxtapose the romanticized past. 
Photos from the 1960s and earlier of public scenes depicting uncovered 
women interacting with men, often in university settings, spread on Twit-
ter as evidence of the absence of sexual harassment in Egypt’s past and to 
show that its society and people then were morally superior compared 
with today. Some asserted that sexual harassment had become part of 
Egyptian culture and tradition, entrenched in the people’s minds and re-
inforced by sexual harassment and masculinity depicted in Egyptian 
cinema. The words sick and animal were frequently used. 
 
8  As early as 2006, Egyptian bloggers were using the internet to spread videos of police 
brutality. See Sameer Padania, “Egypt: Bloggers Open the Door to Police Brutality Debate,” 
Global Voices, 9 December 2006, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2006/12/09/egypt-bloggers-
open-the-door-to-police-brutality-debate (accessed 7 June 2015). 
9  Patrick Kingsley, “Egyptian Police ‘Using Rape as a Weapon’ against Dissident Groups,” 
Guardian, 12 April 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/12/egypt-police-
rape-dissidents-crackdown-16000-arrested (accessed 7 June 2015); International Federa-
tion of Human Rights, “Exposing State Hypocrisy: Sexual Violence by Security Forces in 
Egypt,” https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/egypt_report.pdf; Habiba Mohsen, “What Made Her 
Go There? Samira Ibrahim and Egypt’s Virginity Test Trial,” Al Jazeera, 16 March 2012, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/03/2012316133129201850.html (accessed 
7 June 2015). 
Freedom to all the people 
who are in prison 
innocently and safety to 
all the girls in the streets, 
public transport and 
public places and 
everywhere. 
(translated from Arabic) 
Harassment is a result of 
the destruction of the 
citizens in this police 
state; under the 
repression of the state 
they live like animals and 
eat and sleep and work 
like animals, so why 
should they control their 
desires? 
(translated from Arabic) 
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The way in which sexual harassment was discussed on Twitter also 
reflected an ongoing renegotiation of values and norms on sexuality, 
revealing fault lines between those holding traditional or patriarchal 
positions and those challenging these views. Examples of women dancing 
in the streets, belly dancers, women smiling at men, and women in certain 
types of clothing were presented as arguments to label certain women as 
immoral and inviting sexual attention, thus seemingly justifying the 
sexual harassment of women like them. Only a few tweets in the sample 
expressed this position and blamed the victims for harassment.10 The 
debate on Egyptian women’s attire — ranging from fully veiled to no veil, 
with the latter being prevalent among the upper classes — also revealed 
fault lines involving religious identity and class. 
The Sexual Harassment Debate and Political Polarization  
The rape video appeared at a time of strong social and political polariza-
tion, and the reactions to it on Twitter strongly mirrored these divisions. A 
prolonged power struggle at the national level had resulted in a multidi-
mensional polarity of supporters of the old regime versus revolutionaries, 
Islamists versus liberals, pro- versus anti-Muslim Brotherhood, and pro- 
versus anti-Sisi activists.11 The polarization that soared after the overthrow 
of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011 was not only reflected in traditional 
media, but also on the internet, including on Twitter.12 Given that the 
rape had occurred during Sisi’s inauguration, the video was immediately 
interpreted by many in a political context. 
For Egyptians, Twitter emerged as a space in which political and ideo-
logical tensions between various groups could be unleashed, and in doing 
so, it revealed deep societal and political fault lines. Judging from profile 
pictures and the content of tweets, outspoken supporters of particular 
political groups (e.g., Sisi versus the Muslim Brotherhood) appeared to 
retweet predominantly within their own communities.13 For instance, 
users who had adopted the symbol of Raba’a al-Adawiya — the black hand 
with four fingers raised against a yellow background — or a picture of 
Mursi tended to retweet one another, while users with nationalistic profile 
 
10  This may be the result of a bias in the sample related to the keywords used for the 
searches. Users justifying sexual harassment might be less inclined to use the term 
harassment in their tweets. Such tweets may therefore be underrepresented in the sample. 
As a result of this same bias, tweets denouncing harassment may be overrepresented. 
11  Magued Osman, “Egypt Must Avoid a ‘Spiral of Silence,’” Cairo Review of Global Affairs, 
19 August 2013, http://www.thecairoreview.com/tahrir-forum/egypt-must-avoid-a-spiral-of-
silence/ (accessed 11 February 2015). 
12  For more background on political polarization in the media, see Kai Hafez, “Radically 
Polarized Publics and the Demise of Media Freedom in Egypt,” Égypte monde arabe, ser. 3, 
no. 12 (2015), http://ema.revues.org/3397 (accessed 6 July 2015). 
13  See Ingmar Weber, Venkata R. Kiran Garimella, and Alaa Batayneh, “Secular vs. 
Islamist Polarization in Egypt on Twitter” (paper presented at the IEEE/ACM International 
Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining), http://www.qcri.com/ 
app/media/1900 (accessed 4 January 2016). 
The cinema and the 
movies of Adel Imam and 
Tamer Hosni celebrate 
sexual harassment as 
representing manhood. 
(translated from Arabic) 
If the sexual harassment 
law was implemented fast 
like the anti-protest law, 
sexual harassment would 
be reduced by 80%. 
(translated from Arabic) 
Some of the worst scum 
in #Egypt go to #Tahrir 
and attend/are in pro 
coup/#Sisi rallies...thats 
why those women are 
raped. Filth #Egypt 
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pictures, such as the Egyptian flag, retweeted each other. References to 
protest squares, namely, Tahrir and Raba’a al-Adawiya — because of their 
emotional, social, and political significance — were used to identify one’s 
position along the political spectrum. 
Twitter users were not just alluding to the two squares per se, but to the 
legitimacy of the political groups associated with the square and by exten-
sion the legitimacy of the political order the different groups supported. 
Sisi opponents who backed the January 25 Revolution contrasted the 
defiled square under Sisi to the mythic-like innocence and purity of Tahrir 
Square during the 2011 gathering of a wide range of social groups united 
in protest against Mubarak. After the revolution, supporters of the Muslim 
Brotherhood compared Tahrir — symbolizing Sisi and the rape incident — 
with the purity and piousness of Raba’a al-Adawiya, where they held pro-
tests against the overthrow of one of their own, President Mursi, by the mili-
tary. The military violently dispersed the Brotherhood sit-in at Raba’a 
al-Adawiya in August 2013, leaving between 600 and 1,000 protesters dead. 
Both secular and religious Sisi opponents attempted to delegitimize the 
newly inaugurated president and at the same time legitimize their own 
stance. They claimed that no sexual violence had occurred during the 
eighteen days of the Tahrir protests in January 2011 or the forty-day sit-in 
at Raba’a al-Adawiya, while emphasizing that it only took a few hours for 
gang rapes to occur at the pro-Sisi inauguration rally. Opponents of the 
new president tagged their tweets with hashtags demanding his removal. 
In turn, Sisi supporters accused the Muslim Brotherhood of spreading 
the rape video. Before Mursi’s overthrow, anti-Mursi protesters believed 
that the Muslim Brotherhood had employed sexual violence to repress pro-
test. Many pro-Sisi Twitter users thus claimed that the video was an old 
recording, from the days of Mursi’s presidency, and that the Brotherhood 
had spread it on social media to mar the inauguration celebrations. Many 
called on their followers not to share the video on social media to avoid 
playing into the hands of the Brotherhood. A plethora of tweets also blamed 
the rise of Islamism for the increase in sexual harassment since the 1970s. 
One user said sexual harassment began when President Anwar al-Sadat 
released Islamists from prison in the 1970s. 
The sample showed how the rape at Sisi’s inauguration was immediately 
politicized and how supporters of various political groups used the crime 
to delegitimize their opponents while legitimizing themselves. It also re-
vealed how Twitter was used by various groups as an infrastructure to 
mobilize their supporters against others through hashtags and counter-
hashtags. In this way, the debate on sexual harassment deepened political 
polarization. 
At the same time, the debate also forced political actors to take a stand. 
Indeed, Sisi released a statement condemning the incident, 14 arrests were 
made, and a committee was formed to investigate sexual harassment and 
 
14  Yasmine Saleh, “Egypt’s Sisi Tells Interior Minister to Fight Sexual Harassment,” 
Reuters, 10 June 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-sisi-harassment-idUSKBN0EL 
17J20140610 (accessed 6 January 2016). 
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to draft a national strategy to combat it. In Sisi’s attempt to counter those 
using the incident to delegitimize his presidency, the state presented itself 
as engaging in the fight against sexual violence. This was in part the result 
of the attention that Twitter brought to the issue. Had it not been for 
social media, the rape video would never have reached a critical mass of 
people to engage in the debate and pressure politicians to take a stand. 
That said, it was the politicization of the incident in a polarized context — 
not the actual sexual violence itself — that explains why the president took 
a clear stand.  
The Anti-Sexual Harassment Movement on Twitter 
Besides supporters of political camps, participants in the debate surround-
ing the rape on Tahrir Square also included human rights advocates, jour-
nalists, and others rejecting the politicization of the incident who used 
Twitter to raise awareness about sexual harassment. The tweet sample 
revealed a Twitter movement against sexual harassment that developed 
because of the online engagement of various organizations working against 
sexual harassment in Egypt and the increased publicity surrounding individ-
ual cases of sexual violence on social and traditional media. The movement 
was not organized, but consisted of a loose group of users spearheaded by 
individual human rights and feminist activists as well as anti-sexual 
harassment organizations. 
The movement is situated beyond Egypt’s political fault lines and has a 
mission to alter the discourse on sexual harassment. Rather than focusing 
on the Tahrir Square incident in the context of politics, movement users 
tried to direct attention to the act of sexual violence itself, condemning 
the sharing of the video as an insult to the victim. Many noted that sexual 
harassment had become a common occurrence in Egypt and cited the high 
number of incidents, emphasizing that children were often victims of 
sexual violence. 
Activists sought to use Twitter in a number of ways to influence the dis-
course on sexual harassment in traditional media. According to one 
member of an anti-sexual harassment organization, “Social media is the 
watchdog for traditional media.”15 After the Tahrir rape video, traditional 
media focused primarily on political reactions to the discussion. Sisi issu-
ing a statement after the disclosure of the video and the arrest of seven sus-
pects constituted the main focus of reporting by Egyptian, regional, and 
international media. In contrast, Twitter allowed individuals to produce 
related or contrasting information, thus offering alternative perspectives. 
According to anti-sexual harassment activists, traditional media reports 
generally tended to be sensationalist, using sexually explicit pictures and 
provocative headlines reinforcing the impression that sexual harassment 
is acceptable. It frequently blamed the victims, and in some cases, even 
 
15  Interviews with members of anti-sexual harassment organizations, Cairo, 1 May 2015. 
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identified them.16 A number of tweets in the sample diligently insisted on 
a precise use of terminology, noting that the incident on Tahrir Square 
had not been sexual harassment, but rape. According to an anti-sexual 
harassment NGO, terms stemming from feminist principles have become 
more common on social media in general and in particular in online news-
papers. 
Naming and shaming is another function of Twitter that was commonly 
employed. On the one had, activists used the strategy to further the cause 
of the anti-sexual harassment movement. For instance, the sample con-
tained tweets shaming Maha Bahnassy, a television correspondent who 
covered Tahrir Square and during a television report appeared to justify 
the rape there by asserting that the people on the square were happy and 
having fun. Her statement caused outrage on Twitter, with many users 
clearly positioning themselves against her. As a result, the network sus-
pended Bahnassy.17 A few months before the Tahrir rape, users had simi-
larly taken to Twitter to name and shame in the case of a student who had 
been sexually harassed at Cairo University. A well-known TV host, Tamer 
Amin, blamed the victim for bringing the harassment upon herself 
because of her clothing.18 Twitter users immediately reacted, criticizing 
Amin and calling for his suspension. Although his employer chose not to 
suspend him, the outrage on Twitter forced him to publically apologize. 
These incidents demonstrate that naming and shaming on Twitter can 
have an important impact beyond the Twittersphere. Also as a consequence 
of Twitter advocacy, one Egyptian activist noted, “Some policemen have 
become afraid of scandal,” which positively influences their behavior 
toward sexual harassment.19 Naming and shaming on Twitter has also 
been used, however, as a form of online sexual harassment, for instance, 
with photos of women along with their names and addresses being shared 
and reference made to them as whores. 
The anti-sexual harassment movement aims to quickly react on Twitter 
to such incidents by calling for investigations, apologies, or suspension 
from Twitter. The goal, according to a member of an anti-sexual harass-
ment organization, is to influence politicians and broadcasters to align 
more with feminist principles. One activist remarked, “Social media is an 
effective tool for this, as there are young people present who have less 
rigged convictions and are more ready to question mainstream positions. 
Because of this, online activism can contribute to a paradigm shift.”20 
 
16  Interviews with members of anti-sexual harassment organizations, Cairo, 30 April, 
1 May, and 2 May 2015. 
17  “TV Presenter Suspended over Sexual Assault Comments,” AhramOnline, 11 June 2014, 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/103455.aspx (accessed 6 January 2016). 
18  “Victim Blamed after Sexual Assault at Cairo University,” Mada Masr, 18 March 2014, 
http://www.madamasr.com/news/victim-blamed-after-sexual-assault-cairo-university (accessed 
6 January 2016). 
19  Interview with an Egyptian gender expert and member of a women’s rights organi-
zation spearheading the anti-sexual harassment movement, Cairo, 30 April 2015. 
20  Interview with an Egyptian gender expert and member of women’s rights organiza-
tion, Cairo, 30 April 2015. 
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The Egyptian debate on sexual harassment was also picked up by Twitter 
users across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), pointing to the 
interconnected regional network of social media. In the past few years in 
Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan, and Morocco in particular, videos docu-
menting sexual harassment have frequently sparked national Twitter 
debates. Human rights and anti-sexual harassment activists from these 
countries are connected through a regional network, forming a trans-
national space for activists concerned with various themes in the MENA 
region. This connectedness allows for transnational campaigns and activ-
ism. In 2011 the Egyptian organization HarassMap together with the Leba-
nese Resist Harassment initiative organized a Twitter campaign with activ-
ists from Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Sudan tweeting under the hashtag 
#EndSH, “SH” meaning sexual harassment.21 
Local Impacts of Anti-Sexual Harassment Activism on Twitter 
Although it was not the first debate on sexual harassment in Egypt, dis-
cussion of the Tahrir Square rape on social media brought widespread 
attention to sexual harassment on Egyptian streets. First, the debate 
showed how Twitter can serve as a magnifying glass for a single event. 
Twitter as a platform was an important catalyst for the discussion because 
it provided the capacity to share the video of the incident, propelling the 
crime to the center of national attention. Only later did traditional media 
pick up the story of the rape and make it headline news. Twitter users 
spread the information and pushed the debate to the extent that it put 
pressure on the state. The debate on Twitter therefore forced politicians to 
take a stand on the issue. 
Second, the sexual harassment debate highlighted the potential power 
of naming and shaming on Twitter. By naming and shaming TV presenters, 
the anti-sexual harassment movement was able to impart a subtle but 
lasting influence on the mainstream discourse. TV presenters must remain 
aware that they can be called out and publicly shamed. Similar strategies 
have also been used in the past to alter the behavior or actions of state 
officials or businesses. 
Third, Twitter as a pool of information also proved to be important for 
putting the rape itself and the state’s response in easy-to-understand social 
and political contexts. It was the highly polarized political landscape that 
created an environment in which Sisi opponents could use the incident to 
try to delegitimize the president by taking to Twitter to make him respon-
sible for the sexual violence on the square. Twitter as a seismograph of 
social tensions is therefore also useful in helping to understand the con-
text of political actions and public sentiment at a given time. 
Although the Tahrir Square episode was just one of many incidents of 
sexual violence in Egypt, it sparked a debate of large proportion, not only 
 
21  Nancy Messieh, “Middle Eastern Bloggers Unite to Fight against Sexual Harassment,” 
TNW News, 20 June 2011, http://thenextweb.com/me/2011/06/20/middle-eastern-bloggers-
unite-to-fight-against-sexual-harassment/ (accessed 6 January 2016). 
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because of the political context, but also because the visual evidence made 
it impossible to deny that sexual harassment is a problem in Egyptian 
society. As one result of the debate, the word taharrush (harassment) 
became the common term to define actions that had previously been 




22  Interview with members of an anti-sexual harassment organization, Cairo, 2 May 2015. 
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Fracking in Algeria on Twitter: Connecting the 
Periphery to the Center and the World, #InSalah 
Isabelle Werenfels 
Unlike Egypt, Algeria has not experienced a major political upheaval in 
which social media were attributed an almost mythical role. Not only did 
Algeria remain largely untouched by the Arab uprisings, its social media 
penetration is lower, and the intersection of Twitter with politics is more 
recent than in most other countries of the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA). Nevertheless, social media have increasingly played a role in 
Algerian domestic conflicts, be they social or political. The Twitter debate 
on fracking — hydraulic fracturing to access shale gas — and on ensuing, 
related protests in Algeria’s south exemplify this. In December 2014, Alge-
rian online platforms began publishing articles on the impending imple-
mentation of fracking near the town of In Salah, in Tamanrasset province, 
some 1,200 kilometers south of Algiers, by the state-owned oil company, 
Sonatrach. Following the official announcement of the first successful 
drills, news of local anti-fracking protests emerged on social media plat-
forms, including Twitter. 
Fracking in Algeria offers a prism through which to trace the unfolding 
of a debate on Twitter, including how distinct networks, solidarities, posi-
tions, and identities were forged on the platform around an issue concern-
ing local populations as well as transnational activists, in this case environ-
mentalists. In the first months of 2015, shale gas exploration, and growing 
protests against it, provoked one of the most intense debates to date with-
in Algeria’s Twitter community, and the platform came to play a subtle 
but nevertheless politically relevant role in the protests: It brought develop-
ments in Algeria’s periphery closer to the country’s center, and it attracted 
international attention to them. It did so by connecting different national 
and international communities, facilitating access to expert knowledge, 
and engaging with traditional media. Paradoxically, amid all this, anti-
fracking Algerian activists on Twitter benefitted from the platform’s mar-
ginal numbers, because this seemingly low profile shielded them from 
being considered a threat by the regime, thus resulting in little govern-
ment interest in exerting control over it. 
Agenda Setters, Language, and Geography 
Twitter evolved in Algeria relatively late compared to other locations in 
the region. There are a number of reasons for this and the (still) very small 
number of subscribers, estimated at 37,000 in March 2014, with 4,030,000 
 
The author would like to thank Maria Kramer and Ahmed Sukker for their substantial 
contributions in extracting and analyzing the Twitter data and Aissam Benaissa for his 
valuable comments. 
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tweets that month.1 First, the internet era arrived in Algeria fairly late, 
largely due to the civil war in the 1990s and the country’s military rule 
and isolation during that period. In 2013 internet penetration stood at 17 
percent, compared to 56 percent in Morocco and 44 percent in Tunisia.2 
Moreover, restrictions on freedom of speech — with blogs repeatedly being 
taken down and bloggers arrested — prevented the emergence of a vibrant 
blogosphere, which in other Arab countries laid the foundation for a 
rapidly expanding Twitter community. In addition, a 3G mobile network 
was only introduced in Algeria in December 2013. Prior to that, Facebook 
was virtually the only game in town, with Twitter unable to benefit from 
one of its main assets — the rapid spread of news and events as they unfold. 
That the primary language of Twitter’s global community is English most 
likely functioned as another barrier in a country that is by far more franco-
phone than anglophone. 
Beginning in 2014, Twitter began to experience growth in Algeria. 
During the 2014 presidential election campaign, activism against a fourth 
mandate for President Abdelaziz Bouteflika virtually exploded under the 
hashtags #Elections2014, #Barakat, #TabJnanou,3 #NonAu4emeMandat, 
#DZ2014, #ﺔﻌﺑار_ةدﮭﻌﻟ_ﻻ. Tweets were picked up by online news platforms 
and by traditional media that did not dare post sharp or mocking com-
ments themselves. Another factor enhancing Twitter’s visibility and 
attracting more users was the increasing presence of local celebrities on 
Twitter, ranging from singers to national radio hosts to international 
soccer stars with Algerian roots. 
Although some of the most active Algerian Twitter users wrote under 
pseudonyms, they chose to do so largely for job security, rather than fear 
of censorship or political repercussions.4 Generally, Algerian influencers 
on Twitter deemed the platform to be the freest medium both in terms of 
freedom from censorship and social control.5 They felt more vulnerable 
 
1  See Racha Mourtada, Fadi Salem, and Sarah Al-Shaer, Citizen Engagement and Public Ser-
vices in the Arab World: The Potential of Social Media, Arab Social Media Report, 6th ed., June 
2014, http://www.mbrsg.ae/getattachment/e9ea2ac8-13dd-4cd7-9104-b8f1f405cab3/Citizen-
Engagement-and-Public-Services-in-the-Arab.aspx. This number was likely to have substan-
tially increased by the end of 2015 judging from the increase in local followers of Algeri-
an agenda setters. Interviews with agenda setters in the fracking debate, Algiers, June 2015. 
2  See “Panorama des Médias en Ligne,” April 2015, http://www.cfi.fr/sites/default/files/ 
panorama-medias-BD_1.pdf (accessed 4 January 2016), 5. 
3  “TabJnanou” is a reference to an expression Bouteflika made in a 2012 speech suggest-
ing that his generation’s time was past. 
4  Interviews with Algerian agenda setters on Twitter, Algiers, June 2015. 
5  According to information published by Twitter, the company did not receive any 
requests for account information from the Algerian government between 1 January 2012 
and 30 June 2015. See “Transparency Report/Information Requests,” https://transparency. 
twitter.com/information-requests/2015/jan-jun (accessed 4 January 2016). As Twitter was 
completely marginal before 2013, it is highly unlikely that the Algerian government has 
ever requested account information from the company. 
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using Facebook in terms of social control by family members and their 
immediate environment.6 
While anti-regime postings on Facebook could lead to legal trouble, as 
happened in the case of a cartoonist supporting the In Salah protests,7 
official interference on Twitter was extremely rare and was typically done 
as a personal initiative by (government) elites offended by a tweet. That 
most Algerians identify the city in which they live speaks to a certain 
degree about their perceptions of freedom on Twitter. Official concern and 
control involving Twitter appeared to increase in 2015, most notably 
because of the response to jihadi actors using the platform.8 
French-Algerian networks versus Maghrebi and pan-Arab networks 
The most easily discernable characteristic of the unfolding Twitter debate 
on In Salah was its language divide. It involved two separate debates — one 
in French, the other in Arabic, with little overlap or cross-referencing. This 
divide appeared to be even more pronounced than the one in Algeria’s 
print press, which was also conducted separately in French and Arabic 
newspapers. The mapping of interactions involving influencers’ accounts 
in the fracking debate between December 2014 and March 2015 shows the 
two distinct networks (Figure 2, p. 32).9 The French-tweeting network was 
larger and denser, meaning that French agenda setters in the debate were 
more active in the shale gas debate than their Arabic-tweeting colleagues. 
Only a few users tweeted in both languages. The bridges between the lan-
guage spheres were either journalists or figures from the Algerian opposi-
tion. In interviews, Algerian agenda setters argued that they used French 
to spread news on In Salah beyond Algeria. This included allowing them to 
reach out and mobilize the Algerian diaspora in France and other coun- 
 
 
6  Interviews with Algerian influencers on Twitter, Algiers, June 2015. One interviewee 
described the difference between the two social media platforms like so: “Facebook rep-
resents the family and the neighborhood, Twitter the world.” 
7  Tahar Djehich was put on trial and sentenced to six months in prison and a fine after 
posting a cartoon on Facebook showing an hourglass with “In Salah” written in the sand 
in the top half and an image of Bouteflika in his wheelchair in the bottom half, about to 
be buried by the sand from In Salah. 
8  For instance, the account of a user in the fracking debate using strongly religious 
language was no longer accessible in fall 2015. For increasing Internet control, see 
Kharief Akram, “Naissance du gendarme du Net: les vraies questions occultées,” El-Watan, 
23 October 2015, http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/naissance-du-gendarme-du-net-les-
vraies-questions-occultees-23-10-2015-306407_109.php (accessed 6 January 2016). 
9  For the definition of influencers, see the section “The Role of Twitter in the MENA 
Region,” 14–15. Twitter accounts included in the network analysis of In Salah were those 
whose tweets contained the most important keywords in the debate in French (In Salah 
and gas de schiste) and Arabic (In Salah and ghaz al-sakhri) for the period between 22 Decem-
ber 2014 and 31 March 2015 and were retweeted at least three times. The samples gath-
ered in this way included 420 French and 270 Arabic tweets. It thus reflected the general 
predominance of the French language in the debate. The mapping shows all mentions 





















































Interactions among Arabic- and French-Tweeting Influencers in the Fracking Debate 
Explanation 
 Time frame: 22 December–31 March 2015. 
 Visualizes interactions (mentions/replies) among influencers regardless of whether there is a  
link to fracking. 
 Size of nodes: Large nodes indicate that a user has significant influence on the entire network,  
so- called eigenvector centrality. 
 Arrows: Indicate that a node is mentioned or replied to at least once by the node to which the  
arrow points. Interaction in both directions results in an arrow with two heads. 
 Green nodes: Accounts involved in the fracking debate that tweeted in Arabic and French. 
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tries. French was also the default for many actors because they used it or 
an Algerian dialect rather than Standard Arabic in daily life.10 
A closer look at the French and the Arabic networks in terms of the geo-
graphic location of Twitter accounts active in the fracking debate reveals 
three striking commonalties: accounts with the most intense interaction 
outside Algeria were located in Paris; the Maghreb did not exist as a 
virtual-spatial community on Twitter (Figures 3 and 4, p. 34 and p. 35); and 
government officials were completely absent from the debate. This last 
finding was not a surprise, as few officials had an active account. That 
Paris constituted a hub of Twitter interaction in the fracking debate could 
be explained by the close and protracted historic relations between Algeria 
and France, though the latter’s importance in the Arabic-tweeting network 
was linked in part to the extraordinary level of Twitter activity by an 
Arabic-language television program on France 24 about the In Salah issue. 
The absence of Algeria’s Maghrebi neighbor’s Morocco and Tunisia in the 
Arabic debate and their weak representation (mainly through Tunisian-
Algerian binationals) in the French debate are striking. Interviews with 
Moroccan and Tunisian influencers on Twitter, with few notable exceptions, 
confirmed that there was limited interest and engagement in debates on 
Algerian domestic issues in their countries. Algerians’ interest in Tunisia 
or Libya was slightly higher, but appeared to be limited to issues of security 
and terrorism. According to Moroccan and Algerian agenda setters, their 
neighbors surfaced on local Twitter debates primarily in cases involving 
neighborly frictions and in regard to the Western Sahara conflict.11 
Beyond these similarities, the patterns in the French and Arabic net-
works forged around fracking and ensuing protests in southern Algeria 
otherwise differed. The Arabic discussion included direct links from small 
towns in the Algerian periphery to Egypt and Qatar, Britain, and France. 
The most active accounts in the debate were those of local and international 
media, including Al Jazeera. Individual influencers included a small num-
ber of oppositional actors, namely, the largest Islamist party, Mouvement 
de la Société pour la Paix, 2014 presidential aspirants, journalists, and a 
(very) few activists. Those users active in the periphery came from towns in 
eastern and southern Algeria that had witnessed previous or ongoing 
unrest and had tried to link the plight of In Salah to their own. Also, an 
Egyptian user persistently, with a modest echo, sought to use Algeria as a 
springboard for mobilizing the Egyptian public. 
In sharp contrast, voices from the periphery were largely absent from 
the French-tweeting network. That said, individual users — ranging from 
opposition politicians to marketing and advertising specialists to private 
 
 
10  When using Arabic, Algerian Twitter users must choose between the local dialect, 
which is only spoken and not understood by Arabs from the Levant and Gulf, and Stand-
ard Arabic, which in the fracking debate presented a challenge for a number of the fran-
cophone agenda setters. Interviews with Algerian agenda setters, Algiers, June 2015. 
11  Interviews with Algerian and Moroccan influencers, Algiers and Rabat, June, Septem-
ber, and October 2015. 
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 Time frame: 22 December–31 March 2015. 
 Visualizes interactions (mentions/replies) among influencers regardless of whether  
there is a link to fracking. 
 Size of nodes: Large nodes indicate that a user has significant influence on the  
entire network, so-called eigenvector centrality. 
 Arrows: Indicate that a node is mentioned or replied to at least once by the node to 
which the arrow points. Interaction in both directions results in an arrow with two heads. 
 Color of nodes: The darker the node, the more important a user’s function as a bridge 
connecting other actors or sub-networks, so-called betweenness centrality. 
 Location: Where only a country is indicated, a more specific location was not provided.  
A node alone indicates an unknown location. 
Figure 3 









































            
Explanation 
 Time frame: 22 December–31 March 2015. 
 Visualizes interactions (mentions/replies) among influencers regardless of whether there is a  
link to fracking. 
 Size of nodes: Large nodes indicate that a user has significant influence on the entire network,  
so-called eigenvector centrality. 
 Arrows: Indicate that a node is mentioned or replied to at least once by the node to which the  
arrow points. Interaction in both directions results in an arrow with two heads. 
 Color of nodes: The darker the node, the more important a user’s function as a bridge connecting 
other actors or sub-networks, so-called betweenness centrality. 
 Location: Where only a country is indicated, a more specific location was not provided.  
A node alone indicates an unknown location. 
Figure 4 
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and public sector economic actors (particularly from the hydrocarbon 
sector) to a large number of journalists — had a stronger presence than in 
the Arabic network.12 Moreover, in the French network, two distinct spaces 
of solidarity and political articulation were discernable. One was a large 
Algerian-French network consisting of Algerians in Algeria and Algerians 
in the French diaspora but actively engaged in shaping debates in their 
country of origin. The other was a France-based network with little connec-
tion to Algeria — the main bridge being a French-Algerian journalist based 
in Algiers — and consisting mainly of French anti-fracking and anti-globali-
zation activists. The members of this network sought to use the publicity 
around In Salah as a point of departure for their proper domestic agendas, 
namely, preventing fracking in France. 
Environmental activists trying to generate solidarities among different 
anti-fracking movements around the world often resorted to English. The 
network forged around the In Salah debate in English (not mapped out 
here) was smaller and less dense than those in Arabic and French. It con-
sisted of loosely connected sub-networks, each representing a different cat-
egory of user: Algerians sitting in London, Berlin, or Paris; a much larger 
group of group accounts, that is, globally active environmental organiza-
tions, mainly from North America; and, finally, what appeared to environ-
mentally conscious individuals from Mexico, Singapore, Dubai, Israel, 
Poland, the Gulf states, and a number of other places. Interaction between 
these different categories of users was weak. 
The focus of the debates varied with the language used. In English, 
environmental issues were more important than in the Algerian debates, 
where fracking soon turned into a springboard for highly politicized and 
generalized anti-government sentiment. 
In both the French and the Arabic debates, a large majority of tweets 
either supported the local anti-government and anti-fracking protests or 
sought to mobilize in favor of them (see Figures 5 and 6). Pro-fracking 
tweets were virtually non-existent in French. This held for the Arabic de-
bate as well, but in this discussion simply informative (i.e., neutral) tweets 
were just as numerous as those in support of the protests or mobilizing for 
them. This high number of neutral tweets appeared to be the logical con-
sequence of the much larger presence of media accounts, both Algerian 
and pan-Arab, in the Arabic sample. 
Hence, in stark contrast to the Egyptian debate on sexual harassment, 
the Algerian fracking debate was not a polarized discussion. The majority 
of participants were in strong agreement against fracking and in their op-
position to the Algerian government. Nevertheless, being deeply embedded 
in local history and the collective memory, the debate brought crosscut-
ting and overlapping fault lines to the surface, both within Algerian poli-
tics and society and in the latter’s relationship with the foreign “other.” 
 
12  Interviews with agenda setters, Algiers, June 2015; observations drawn from Algerian 
Twitter debates. 
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Figure 5 Figure 6 
Positions in Arabic Tweets  Positions in French Tweets 
Discursive Fault Lines: The International and Domestic “Enemy” 
Key subtexts to many tweets on fracking were colonial and post-colonial 
traumas experienced by the populations of Algeria’s south and resonating 
across the nation. For one, the fear of environmental hazards, namely, pol-
lution of Saharan water reserves, mentioned in many tweets, fed off the 
collective trauma inflicted by France’s nuclear testing in southern Algeria 
between 1960 and 1966. 
France, as a central point of reference, was present in varying contexts 
and ways. The ominous main étrangère, present implicitly or explicitly in 
many tweets, tended primarily to allude to France. Some tweets saw France 
as pressuring the Algerian government into fracking. Along the same line, 
anger was directed at multinationals of French background, namely, Total. 
The company felt sufficiently compelled to tweet that it was not involved 
in the Algerian fracking project. 
Some users expressed the sentiment of being in competition with 
France. For instance, a rare pro-fracking tweet triumphantly asserted that 
Algeria was more modern than France because of its fracking enterprise. 
At the same time, the anti-fracking camp on Twitter drew on information 
opposing shale gas and solidarity from French environmentalists. France 
and the French thus were attributed multiple and contradictory roles in 
the debate — that of the (eternal) enemy, the competitor, and the partner 
of Algerians against their government. 
The Algerian “others” 
In addition to the language gap, another divide evident in the sample 
Tweets involved socioeconomic and sociocultural Algerian cleavages, that 
is, the Algerian “others.” Numerous tweets referred to anger that had built 
up in the south over decades and drew links to a protest movement of the 
unemployed that had emerged in the southern town of Ouargla in 2012 to 
demand a fairer distribution of wealth between regions. Tweets also con-
Saharan people are the 
laboratory rats! After  
the French nuclear tests 
we are now seeing the 
successors of the French 
doing the same 
(translated from Arabic) 
The water in Algeria:  
It is for Total, not for  



















Fracking in Algeria on Twitter: Connecting the Periphery to the Center and the World, #InSalah 
SWP Berlin 
Twitter Debates and Networks  




tained media links referring to the south’s economic marginalization 
despite it being the location of the country’s main resources of oil and gas. 
Ethnic discrimination against southern populations — mainly dark-
skinned Arab and Tuareg tribes and their former slaves from sub-Saharan 
Africa — was a recurring topic, reflected in the hashtag #Algerians_are_ 
slaves_in_their_country. Users spoke of a “forgotten people in the south” or 
argued that had the fracking protests taken place in the city of Tizi-Ouzou, 
in the north, French human rights organizations would have cared much 
more. Tweets also drew parallels between colonial disregard for the indig-
enous population and the current Algerian government’s perceived con-
tempt toward the populations of the south, for instance, quoting the 
Algerian writer Kamel Daoud’s assertion that the people of the south were 
being treated like “nude Indians.” 
The profound disconnect between governing elites and some parts of 
the population was the most important fault line that emerged in the 
Twitter debate on In Salah. From the beginning of the drilling and the pro-
tests, the government’s handling of the situation could not be dissociated 
from the dynamics of the larger Algerian political arena: A sick president, 
behind-the-scenes succession struggles that produced erratic political 
decision making, and a serious and looming economic crisis combined to 
produce a high degree of general uncertainty among the population in 
2015, all of which was reflected in the Twitter debate. 
The exposure of government and governance failures, the absence of 
long-term strategies, the political elites’ lack of legitimacy, and repression 
of political activists featured as recurring topics in the French- and Arabic-
tweeting networks. Tweets also commented on discordant government 
communications, for instance, the president saying that shale gas explora-
tion was not on the agenda and then a few weeks later arguing that oil and 
gas are gifts from God, and thus it is a duty to extract them. 
Often users tweeted quotes by officials and contrasted them with infor-
mation from on the ground in In Salah. Take, for instance, Prime Minister 
Abdelmalek Sellal’s claim that “the situation is normal in In Salah,” while 
journalists were reporting on unfolding clashes and brutal crackdowns by 
security forces. 
The longer the debate continued, the more links were made to failures 
or the lack of strategies in other policy areas, such as agriculture, non-
hydrocarbon industries, and health. In other words, #gasdeschiste became 
a symbol for domestic grievances and for regime failure, establishing a 
point of departure for generalized attacks on the regime. 
Twitter as Politics from Below: 
Raising Awareness, Amplifying the Cause, Building the Nation 
The anti-government dynamics on Twitter did not meet with counter-propa-
ganda or trolling by the government. Instead, the government focused its 
efforts on traditional media to try to delegitimize the protest camp by, for 
instance, blaming foreign forces for inciting the street against shale gas. 
An information about 
Algeria: There is a 
forgotten people in the 
Sahara. It is ok to kill 
them with shale gas. 
#Non_au_gaz_de_schiste 
(translated from Arabic) 
We have strikes, the 
president is out of reach, 
the new family law, the 
corruption, the violation 
of human rights, and 
then they tell you: 
#Algeria_is_the_nation 
_of_pride_and_dignity 
(translated from Arabic) 
My President, oil is  
below 60$, shale gas  
is not profitable,  
what are we doing? 







(translated from Arabic) 
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The effort failed to resonate on Twitter, or it was met with irony. The Twit-
ter debate on fracking thus displayed dynamics different from those in 
Algeria’s print press. Private local newspapers reported broadly on the pro-
tests, and some were highly critical of the government’s fracking plans. 
One paper, El Watan, also appeared to attempt to trigger emotions by 
strongly emphasizing the protesters’ anger and the government’s repres-
sive response. In general, however, the newspapers tended to express their 
criticisms indirectly, by quoting fiercely anti-fracking experts. On Twitter, 
“ordinary people” voiced their critiques directly in a more activist and 
ironic manner and steeped in visual and audio subcultures.13 
While mobilization for the protests took place primarily via Facebook, 
agenda setters on Twitter pursued a number of other, clearly discernable 
goals: to better inform citizens, use the local struggle to build national 
political solidarities, and bring the situation of Algeria’s periphery to the 
attention of the center and the international media. 
The way tweets on the fracking protests spread not only points to infor-
mation flows in multiple directions, but also to intricate cross-media 
dynamics: French- and English-tweeting Algerian agenda setters took infor-
mation from the Facebook pages of key players in In Salah, namely, the 
Sun&Power association, and used Twitter to convey news on events as they 
unfolded in the periphery directly to their followers from the internation-
al media. For these Algerian influencers, Twitter accounts and Facebook 
pages in the periphery served as the functional equivalent of local corre-
spondents for national newspapers. In turn, for members of the interna-
tional media, Twitter accounts of agenda setters in Algiers fulfilled a for-
eign correspondent’s role. International media, according to local agenda 
setters, only took notice of their articles if they posted them on Twitter, 
where they often added an additional ironic or provocative spin that the 
national press would not dare publish.14 
Articles in Le Monde, the New York Times, and other newspapers on fracking 
in Algeria not only went out to new Twitter audiences (e.g., international 
environmental networks via the globally known and active author Noemi 
Klein), but they also traveled back to Algeria via Twitter, assuring local 
actors of international interest and conveying new technical information 
on fracking to local audiences. In some cases, factually incorrect informa-
tion appeared in the debate, for instance, claims that the United States had 
stopped fracking, but this information was not picked up by debate influ-
encers. 
The mapping of Twitter networks shows how information bounced back 
and forth among various media (including news websites) and individual 
and collective (party, movement) accounts (Figure 7, p. 40). The one com-
pany involved, the French oil and gas giant Total, became the target of  
 
 
13  For instance, numerous tweets posted links to caricatures, graffiti, and raps support-
ing the protest movement. For a popular anti-government In Salah rap, see https://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=os_U00FHZ6U (accessed 5 January 2016). 
14  Interviews with journalists on their professional use of Twitter, Algiers, June 2015. 
Joke of the evening: 
Minister of energy claims 
Sonatrach able to extract 
shale gas without 
endangering the environ-
ment.” #Algeria 
(translated from Arabic) 
@noemiklein check this 
unprecedented peaceful 
citizen movmt in 
#Algeria Sahara to protest 
shale gas project 
nytimes.com/2015/02/26 




















































 Time frame: 22 December–31 March 2015. 
 Visualizes interactions (mentions/replies) among influencers regardless of whether there is a  
link to fracking. 
 Size of nodes: Large nodes indicate that a user has significant influence on the entire network,  
so- called eigenvector centrality. 
 Arrows: Indicate that a node is mentioned or replied to at least once by the node to which the  
arrow points. Interaction in both directions results in an arrow with two heads. 
 Movement = Movement or organization. 
 Media = Print, television, radio, or news website. 
 
Figure 7 
Interplay among Individual, Media, and Group Accounts in the Fracking Debate 
Twitter as Politics from Below: Raising Awareness, Amplifying the Cause, Building the Nation 
SWP Berlin 
Twitter Debates and Networks  




attacks and got involved in the Twitter debate to deny any involvement in 
fracking in In Salah.15 
While Algerian agenda setters explicitly understood themselves to be an 
amplifier to the outside world,16 their primary concern remained national. 
National agenda setters, through their tweets, sought to feed information 
back to the periphery, for instance, mentioning solidarity actions in 
Algiers, such as Islamist members of parliament staging an anti-fracking 
protest in the legislature or efforts by well-known opposition figures to 
demonstrate in Algiers that were aborted by the security forces. In this 
way, they sought to bring Algerian citizens closer together. 
Not only were the actual protests in In Salah entrenched in national 
symbolism (e.g., protesters wrapped in the Algerian flag), but tweets 
sought to promote the idea of citizenship and an inclusive nation. The 
terms citizen (al-muatin) and civil society (al-mujtama’ al-madani) were used 
more prominently in tweets than the people (ash-sha’ab), and dozens of 
tweets stressed the peaceful nature of the fracking protests. Twitter users 
demanded participation in decisions on fracking and proposed a national 
referendum on the issue. One important effort by local Twitter activists 
was to nationalize the local shale gas issue and create solidarity among the 
oppressed and marginalized, be it with the Mozabites, an Algerian reli-
gious and ethnic minority, or with the unemployed in southern towns, 
with solidarity marches for In Salah organized via Facebook and Twitter. 
Occasional efforts by partisan actors, both religious and political, to 
push their agenda did not resonate on Twitter. Opposition political figures 
and largely marginal parties trying to promote themselves by jumping on 
the fracking protest bandwagon were active, but did no manage to hijack a 
Twitter debate dominated by activists uninvolved in party politics. Voices 
putting forward religious arguments or using religious language were 
completely marginalized in the fracking debate. 
While most Algerian agenda setters had civil society activists from other 
Arab countries following them, they did not or could not ignite a debate 
on fracking elsewhere in the region. A few Egyptian and Tunisian users 
repeatedly sought to raise awareness against fracking in their respective 
countries, but could not create a buzz. This goes to show that Twitter 
mobilization efforts can be successful only in fertile soil, as was the case in 
Algeria, where people in the south had been angered by decades of neglect 
and marginalization. There, shale gas became a rallying cry and a vehicle for 
socioeconomic and political protests against post-colonial elites who were 
perceived as denying them participation and as having failed in nation 
building. 
 
15  The position of Total at the intersection of France and Algeria, its many mentions in 
both countries, and its importance in the mapping can be explained by its engagement  
in the debate to deny any involvement at all. 
16  Several Algerian influencers interviewed specifically identified this effect as one of the 
main reasons for using Twitter and for writing in French or in English rather than in 
Arabic. 
Shale gas is not the 
problem of the people in 
the south, it is the 
problem of all Algerians 
(translated from Arabic) 
#Algeria: Thousands of 
citizens demonstrating 
peacefully against the 
#Gaz_de_schiste in 
#InSalah 
(translated from French) 
#No_to_alcohol_in_ 
Algeria Shale gas wasn’t 
enough, now you added 
alcohol, may God take 
revenge upon you Sellal 
and your cronies 
(translated from Arabic) 
Fracking in Algeria on Twitter: Connecting the Periphery to the Center and the World, #InSalah 
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At the same time, the debate demonstrated the multiple and politically 
relevant roles Twitter can assume, apart from mobilization, with which 
the literature most often associates it. In the Algerian case, Twitter did not 
bring about political change. It could not even stop explorative drilling. It 
did, however, have other, more subtle effects that could make a difference 
in the long term. 
Twitter took on the function of facilitating information flows and 
spreading knowledge among different social groups in a vast country. By 
quickly informing activists at the center and in the periphery of respective 
relevant developments as they unfolded, it contributed to creating solidar-
ities between different disaffected social groups across a territory roughly 
four times the size of France. In other words, Twitter, may contribute to 
bringing different and diverse parts of a huge country closer together and 
thus play a role in nation building. 
Moreover, Twitter in the fracking debate presented a new, largely non-
ideological but highly critical space for regular citizens to inform them-
selves and comment on politics. It promoted irony and subcultures as 
important forms of protest. Finally, it served as an amplifier of internal 
Algerian events to the international media. Twitter, as a political infra-
structure, thus contributed to raising awareness about Algerian problems 
and challenges among international policy makers without the latter even 
having to consult Twitter or being aware of the role it played in bringing 
the news to them. 
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Saudi Intervention in Yemen: Domestic Lens, 
Regional Solidarity, #OpDecisiveStorm 
Mareike Transfeld 
In the early morning of 26 March 2015, the Saudi military, backed by a 
broad regional alliance, militarily intervened in Yemen with the declared 
goal of defending the Yemeni state from the advancement of Houthi 
militias. The intervention was discussed globally on Twitter, as users in 
different countries reacted to the news on their television screens, with a 
multitude of national and transnational networks joining in the debate. 
Nationalities that were particularly outspoken on Twitter included Saudis, 
Kuwaitis, Emiratis, Bahrainis, Pakistanis, Egyptians, Iranians, Lebanese, 
and Yemenis along with Americans and Indians. Despite its global nature, 
this Twitter debate demonstrated well how Twitter users are embedded in 
networks that develop around domestic issues and how they view events 
occurring elsewhere primarily through the lens of domestic politics: While 
the debate crystallized around the intervention in Yemen, each Twitter 
community discussed the topic from a perspective of national politics. At 
the same time, Twitter served as the infrastructure connecting like-minded 
people, thus enabling the emergence of spaces of solidarity, that is, 
“swarms of ad hoc, self-steering collective actors” and/or “weak networks.”1 
As in the debate on fracking, different language spheres in the interven-
tion debate had differing contours. The English-language sphere was rather 
geographically diverse, with a high presence of Yemenis, Americans, Ira-
nians, and Indians, while nationals from the Gulf states were largely ab-
sent. The Arabic-language debate was dominated primarily by Saudis, and 
to a lesser degree Kuwaitis, Emiratis, Bahrainis, Egyptians, and Yemenis. 
While users from the Levant, specifically, Lebanon, were also present, 
Maghrebi users were largely absent. That Saudis dominated the Arabic 
Twitter debate came as no surprise given their country’s centrality to the 
issue, the sheer size of the Saudi Twitter community, and the predomi-
nance of Arabic among Twitter users in Saudi Arabia.2 
 
1  Such weak networks can be defined as “groups constituted by extensive, yet casual and 
limited social interaction.” See Felix Stalder, Digital Solidarity, Mute and the Post-Media Lab, 
2013, p. 31, http://www.metamute.org/sites/www.metamute.org/files/u1/Digital-Solidarity-
Felix-Stalder-9781906496920-web-fullbook. pdf (accessed 17 February 2016). 
The author would like to thank Lina Najmi and Khalil Teber for extracting English 
tweets, Ahmed Sukker for contributing substantially to extracting and translating Arabic 
tweets, and Khalil Teber for preparing data visualizations. 
2  In March 2014, 92 percent of tweets from Saudi Arabia were in Arabic. In contrast, on 
Facebook, English appeared to be the more popular language among Saudi social media 
users. See Racha Mourtada, Fadi Salem, and Sarah Al-Shaer, Citizen Engagement and Public 
Services in the Arab World: The Potential of Social Media, Arab Social Media Report, 6th ed., June 
2014, 31 and 39, http://www.mbrsg.ae/getattachment/e9ea2ac8-13dd-4cd7-9104-b8f1f405 
cab3/Citizen-Engagement-and-Public-Ser vices-in-the-Arab.aspx. 
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Twitter in the Arabian Peninsula 
In the Middle East, Gulf state citizens are the most ardent Twitter users, 
and unlike in the rest of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), they 
prefer Twitter to Facebook.3 Out of all the MENA countries, the Saudi Twit-
ter community is the largest. In fact, with 2,414,000 users, the Saudi popu-
lation is one of the most active users of Twitter worldwide. The United 
Arab Emirates, with 502,000 users, is the third largest Twitter community 
in the region, followed by Kuwait, with 344,000 users. In comparison, 
Yemen (128,000), Qatar (112,000), Oman (80,800), and Bahrain (62,200) 
have smaller absolute user numbers, but given the small populations of 
the Gulf states, the Arabian Peninsula has the highest Twitter penetration 
per capita in the region.4 
The Saudi Twitter community, similar to Egypt’s, developed against the 
backdrop of an already existing blogosphere. After the September 11 al-
Qaeda attacks against the United States, Saudi Arabia was widely accused 
of exporting an intolerant version of Islam and came increasingly under 
international pressure to implement democratic reforms and curtail 
radical preachers. At that time, liberals and the liberal press in Saudi Arabia 
became more outspoken.5 It was in this context that the Saudi blogosphere 
emerged. 
With the onset of the Arab Spring, Saudi bloggers became more out-
spoken in the digital sphere, boosting Twitter’s popularity. In addition, the 
introduction of an Arabic-language interface in March 2012 lead to a dra-
matic increase in Twitter users in the kingdom.6 In 2010 the most popular 
Saudi Twitter profiles were mostly tech-savvy activists, entrepreneurs in 
marketing and branding, designers, and programmers.7 Today, these activ-
ists have been overtaken in terms of popularity by conservative clerics, TV 
personalities, and members of the royal family.8 
 
3  In the United Arab Emirates, for instance, common reasons given for preferring Twitter 
over Facebook included that it is faster, easier to get news from (about the community), 
and simpler to use. Facebook was described as crowded with applications. See Catherine 
Strong and Hessah Hareb, “Social Media Fashion among Digitally Fluent Young Arabic 
Women in the UAE,” Journal of Middle East Media 8, no. 1 (2012): 8, http://www2.gsu.edu/ 
~wwwaus/Vol8/JMEM2012_Strong_and_Hareb.pdf (accessed 5 January 2016). 
4  Mourtada, Salem, and Al-Shaer, Citizen Engagement and Public Services in the Arab World, 33. 
5  Richard Dekmejian, “The Liberal Impulse in Saudi Arabia,” Middle East Journal 57, no. 3 
(2003): 400–13. Also see, for example, Joel Campagna, “Saudi Arabia Report: Princes, 
Clerics, and Censors,” Committee to Protect Journalists, https://cpj.org/reports/2006/05/ 
saudi-06.php (accessed 5 January 2016). 
6  Colin Simpson, “Coming to the Web: Twitter in Arabic,” National/UAE, 21 January 2012, 
http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/coming-to-the-web-twitter-in-arabic (accessed 5 Janu-
ary 2016). 
7  Ahmed, “Top Ten Twitter Users in Saudi Arabia,” Saudi Jeans, 28 November 2010, http:// 
saudijeans.org/2010/11/28/top-ten-twitter-users-saudi-arabia (accessed 5 January 2016). 
8  Garrett Nada and Faris Al Sulayman, “Twitter Sheikhs of Saudi-Arabia,” Al-Monitor, 18 
December 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/twitter-sheikhs-saudi-
arabia.html# (accessed 5 January 2016). 
Twitter in the Arabian Peninsula 
SWP Berlin 
Twitter Debates and Networks  




The topics discussed by Saudis on Twitter are diverse, ranging from life-
style issues to religion and the royal family. With the increase in users, 
Twitter debates became more reflective of society and the public discourse 
in Saudi Arabia,9 encompassing debates critical of the religious and politi-
cal establishments, including the religious police or sexual harassment.10 
Although the space Twitter provides for such debates is freer than in the 
case of traditional media, there are clear redlines that Saudi Twitter users 
well know. For example, although it is acceptable for users to target the gov-
ernment, it is unacceptable to criticize the royal family.11 Spreading atheist 
ideas, by Saudi law considered an act of terrorism, is another redline.12 
Hence, a paradox exists in regard to the internet in the Gulf states. These 
states are the most ardent proponents of the internet in the MENA region, 
particularly concerning e-governance, and their citizens are the most 
active Twitter users in the region. At the same time, in comparison with 
other MENA states, the Gulf countries have the strictest censorship regimes, 
dramatically limiting freedom of speech on social media.13 Detailed and 
harsh social media laws around the Gulf provide the basis for the arrest of 
individuals for content spread on the internet. Saudi Arabia also has laws 
imposing the death penalty for certain content posted to social media.14 
Beyond that, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in particular rely on trolls and bots 
(automated Twitter accounts) to spread information to influence debates 
(including by hijacking hashtags) and force users to self-censor.15 
 
9  Ahmed Al Omran, “Ahmed Al Omran on Social Media and the Saudi Blogosphere,” 
Jadaliyya, 7 March 2013, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/10501/ahmed-al-omran-on-
social-media-and-the-saudi-blogo (accessed 6 January 2016). 
10  Miriam Seyffarth and Robert Bosch Kulturmanager, unpublished report on Twitter in 
Saudi Arabia, Jeddah, 5 February 2015. 
11  William Bauer, “The Self-Censored World of Saudi Social Media,” Your Middle East, 
29 April 2013, http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/columns/article/the-selfcensored-world-of-
saudi-social-media_10516 (accessed 6 January 2016). 
12  Human Rights Watch, “Saudi Arabia: New Terrorism Regulations Assault Rights. Cam-
paign to Silence Peaceful Activists,” 20 March 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/ 
20/saudi-arabia-new-terrorism-regulations-assault-r ights (accessed 6 January 2016). 
13  In 2011 the Saudi prince Alwaleed bin Talal acquired a $300 million stake in Twitter, 
which soon sparked debate about a possible relationship between him and a Twitter 
policy introduced in 2012 allowing countries to selectively block tweets. See Katerina 
Nikolas, “Waleed and Twitter Censorship,” Digital Journal, 30 January 2012, http://www. 
digitaljournal.com/article/318709 (accessed 20 January 2016); Brian Whitaker, “Alwaleed 
bin Talal: From Saudi Prince to King of Twitter?,” Guardian, 20 December 2011, http:// 
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/dec/20/alwaleed-bin-talal-twitter-saudi-prince 
(accessed 20 January 2016). 
14  Jay Akbar, “Revealed: Saudi Arabia Warns Twitter and Facebook ‘Rumour-Mongers’ 
They Risk Death Penalty in First Ruling of Its Kind,” Daily Mail, 6 October 2015, http:// 
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3261575/Saudi-Arabia-warns-Twitter-Facebook-rumour-
mongers-risk-DEATH-PENALTY-ruling-kind.html (accessed 6 January 2016). 
15  Freedom House, “Freedom on the Net: Saudi Arabia,” 2015, https://freedomhouse.org/ 
report/freedom-net/2015/saudi-arabia (accessed 20 January 2016). 
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With 128,000 users (as of March 2014) in Yemen, Twitter is far less preva-
lent there than in Saudi Arabia. Also, in contrast to Saudi Arabia as well as 
Egypt, Yemen did not have an active blogging scene prior to the 2011 
popular protests, although a number of Yemeni tribal and Islamists partici-
pated in online forums. After the 2011 regional protests gained momen-
tum, and social media became popular, Yemenis began flocking to the 
social media and networking sites. Today, a variety of social groups are rep-
resented, but educated activists, journalists, and politicians are the most 
outspoken. While freedom of speech has dramatically decreased with the 
takeover of Sana’a by the Houthi rebels in September 2014, with numerous 
kidnappings, arrests, and killings of journalists, there is no monitoring of 
social media websites, making it an important platform for voicing criti-
cism and sharing information with the international community.  
Networks and Hierarchies: Elite Actors in the Intervention Debate 
In trying to grasp the global debate with Saudi Arabia and Yemen at its 
center, English and Arabic tweets containing the word Yemen were analyzed 
to identify the different network contours and themes. With regard to 
Arabic-language Twitter users’ reactions to the 2015 Saudi intervention 
during its first week, all tweets were extracted that contained the term 
Yemen in Arabic during 26–31 March and were retweeted at least forty-five 
times. The sample contained a total of 475 tweets. Because of the sheer size 
of the debate in English — the amount of English tweets by far exceeded 
Arabic tweets — only a small sample could be collected, consisting of those 
retweeted forty-five or more times on 31 March. To compensate for the 
short time frame of the data set, extensive qualitative observation of the 
debate on Twitter took place over a longer period of time, 26 March 
through 15 October. 
The Arabic sample was made up predominantly of users from the Gulf 
countries, the most dominant individuals being TV personalities, diplo-
mats, athletes and journalists, but political analysts, singers, bloggers, and 
average citizens (“ordinary people”) were also present. It is striking that 
unlike in the debates on sexual harassment and fracking, the dominant 
users in the Saudi-Yemeni debate rarely interacted with each other (see 
Figure 8). These users — who included the Yemeni Nobel Peace Prize 
laureate Tawakkol Karman and other Gulf celebrities, diplomatic officials, 
and media outlets — posted their opinions or spread information and were 
retweeted by other users rather than engaging in discussions with each 
other through mentions or replies (see Figure 9, p. 48).16 A similar observa-
tion can be made in the English debate, where various Twitter communi- 
 
 
16  Because there was little interaction among the most dominant users in this data set, 
another data set had to be relied on to visualize the network dynamics in the interven-
tion debate. For that reason, retweeting networks were examined with data extracted using 
streaming API. We would like to thank Robert Jäschke at the L3S Forschungszentrum in 
Hannover and the Leibniz Universität Hannover for providing us with the data set. 
#DecisiveStorm This war 
is for #Yemen and it is 
not sectarian because all 
Yemenis are brothers 
regardless of the different 
sects, they are our 
brothers except those 
that agreed to and 
accepted to be 
collaborators of Iran. 
(translated from Arabic) 
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Interaction of Dominant Users in the Military Intervention Debate 
Explanation 
 Time frame: 26–31 March 2015. 
 Visualizes interactions (mentions/replies) of most dominant users in the Arabic-language 
sample. Of a total of 176 users, only those among w hom interaction occurred are visualized. 
 Size of nodes: Large nodes indicate that a user has signif icant inf luence on the entire netw ork, 
so-called eigenvector centrality. 
 Color of nodes: The darker the node, the more important a user’s function as a bridge 
connecting other actors or sub-networks, so-called betweenness centrality. 
 Arrows: Indicate direction of main interaction. 
 
ties across the globe engaged in a discussion on the intervention in Yemen. 
In India, Pakistan, and the United States, politicians voiced their opinions 
in debates with public officials (among them the U.S. senator John McCain) 
and media receiving most retweets. Political analysts, human rights activ-
ists, and international organizations were also often retweeted. The global 
reach was broader and the number of political and economic elites partici-
pating in this particular debate was higher than in the other debates 
analyzed in this study. This is certainly due to the regional nature of the 
issue discussed, the high Twitter penetration in the Gulf as well as the in-




















































 Time frame: 24–31 March 2015. 
 Visualizes retweeting networks of dominant users who were retweeted more than 7,500 times. 
 Size of nodes: Large nodes indicate that a user has significant influence on the entire network,  
so-called eigenvector centrality. 
Note: The data for this graph was extracted directly using stream API (keyword: Yemen in English and Arabic). 
Figure 9 
Retweeting Network of Dominant Users in the Military Intervention Debate 
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The Arabic Debate: Sectarian and Regional 
Fault Lines and Solidarities  
In the Arabic-language sphere, a number of Twitter communities actively dis-
cussed the intervention in Yemen. Next to Saudi and Yemeni users, Arabic-
language users were based in various Gulf states, Lebanon, and Egypt. 
While they all engaged in the debate, they did so within networks formed 
around domestic issues while forging regional solidarities that reveal sec-
tarian and regional fault lines. With very few exceptions, the Arabic 
sample tweets that mostly originated in the Gulf states were supportive of 
the Saudi intervention. Most users who expressed their opinions about it 
framed their arguments in nationalistic or sectarian language, often refer-
encing geopolitics, while assessing the events through a domestic prism. 
By referring to Yemenis as their brothers, these users sought to forge a 
solidarity with the people of Yemen. Indeed, Yemenis opposing the Houthis 
also engaged in direct exchanges with Twitter users from parts of the Gulf. 
This emerging transnational space of solidarity, however, was a Sunni 
space in which the word Yemenis meant Sunni Yemenis. Those users who 
viewed the Houthis as not being Yemenis ignored the role of the Houthi 
movement in Yemeni politics and the diversity of Yemeni society. The Hou-
this were only viewed through a sectarian prism, framed as Shiites, enemies 
of Yemen, occupiers, terrorists, and traitors. They were also associated with 
Iran and (Shiite) Hizballah and described as the devil and as Safavids.17 Not 
perceiving Shiites as Muslims, some users explicitly hoped for a Muslim 
(Sunni) victory over the Houthis, while Saudi Arabia was described as the 
land or people of tawhid (the oneness of God, a central principle of Wahhabi 
Islam) and the leader of the Sunnis. Victory over Iran was viewed as the 
victory of God. This Twitter discourse was reflective of the Saudi govern-
ment’s stance and national media discussions, in which Iran and Shiites in 
general were perceived as the enemy. Because of the Saudi monarchy’s sec-
tarian politics and fear of Iranian influence in the region, the conflict in 
Yemen was by Saudi politicians and media outlets only viewed through 
this prism, with Iran’s involvement in Yemen exaggerated in the debate. 
Sectarian language was accompanied by Arab nationalist references and 
underpinned with geopolitical arguments. Many Gulf users in the sample 
strongly identified as Arab. Because they saw the Houthis as having be-
trayed Arabs, they supported the intervention to protect the “Arabness” of 
Yemen. Users offered prayers and support to the soldiers of the Saudi mili-
tary, often referring to them as the Eagles of the Peninsula or the Eagles of 
Islam. Tweets hailed the intervention, including the Saudi role, as bringing 
stability to the region and defending the Saudi nation and all Sunni Mus-
lims. As such, the military intervention was mentioned in the same breath 
as past Saudi interventions in Kuwait (1990) and Bahrain (2011) and the 
 
17  The Safavid dynasty ruled Iran between 1501 and 1722 and established Twelver Shia 
Islam as the official religion of the Safavid Empire. 
When the people of 
Tawhid triumph over the 
Houthis in Yemen, which 
is not out of God’s ability, 
it is as if they destroyed 
the right eye of Iran, 
Bashar’s fall would be the 
destruction of its left eye. 
Oh God, hurry with your 
victory. 
(translated from Arabic) 
#YemenTheOriginofArabs 
what brings Persians to 
Yemen, God bring back 
security and stability to 
Yemen. 
(translated from Arabic) 
KSA is the heart of 
Muslims: when Bahrain 
was in trouble, our 
soldiers went. When 
Yemen was in trouble, 
our soldiers headed there. 
When Egypt’s economy 
was in trouble, we gave 
them money. Oh God 
protect our country and 
our soldiers. 
(translated from Arabic) 
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economic intervention in Egypt (since 2013). Others called for interven-
tions in the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Syria. 
With the prominence of Saudi Twitter users in the debate, the pro-Saudi 
discourse was the most dominant in the Arabic-language sphere. In April 
2015, after this study’s time frame for analysis, two explicitly [pro-]Sunni 
accounts claiming to be based in Sana’a and having more than 100,000 fol-
lowers (an unusually high number for a Yemeni account) came to dominate 
the Arabic sphere over a sustained period of time, tweeting anti-Houthi 
and pro-Saudi messages. The users retweeting these accounts were primarily 
based in the Gulf, judging by user names and profile pictures. Some of the 
accounts that retweeted the two users, however, have since been suspended, 
and others appear to be bots, automatically retweeting tweets to influence 
the overall discourse (see Figure 10, p. 52, dark blue network). 
Voices supporting the Houthis were absent from the sample of domi-
nant users and tweets. The enormous Saudi presence in the Arabic-lan-
guage sphere simply dwarfed Yemeni and non-Yemeni supporters of the 
Houthis and opponents of the war in general.18 The dominance of the Sunni 
voices did not, however, preclude a Shiite space of solidarity in the inter-
vention debate. 
Houthis used Twitter to trigger supportive reactions in various places, 
including Iraq.19 Protests against the intervention took place in Lebanon, 
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain,20 but Arabic tweets opposing the inter-
vention were not retweeted enough to make it into the sample, and fear 
likely prevented users in the Gulf from speaking out against the war. 
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait cracked down immediately on critical 
voices and protest against the intervention.21 In Bahrain, where a strong 
Shiite opposition movement exists, government officials used Twitter to 
voice their support for the military campaign, but voices from Bahrain 
opposing the war were absent from the sample. In April 2015, in Qatif, in 
Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, where disenfranchised members of the 
Shiite minority have repeatedly protested the Saudi regime, the security 
apparatus cracked down on demonstrations against the war in Yemen.22 
 
18  See, for similar findings, Alexandra Siegel, Sectarian Twitter Wars: Sunni-Shia Conflict and 
Cooperation in the Digital Age, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 
2015, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_262_Siegel_Sectarian_Twitter_Wars_.pdf 
(accessed 12 February 2016). 
19  See, for instance, Oren Dotan, “Rebels in Yemen Are Using Twitter, Facebook to 
Crowdfund Weaponry: Their Efforts on Twitter and Facebook Immediately Sparked Re-
taliation from Pro-Saudi Social Media Users,” Vocativ, 29 March 2015, http://www.vocativ. 
com/world/yemen-world/houthi-rebels-crowd-funding-their-yemen-takeover/ (accessed 6 
January 2016). 
20  Thalia, “Tracking Protests Worldwide against Decisive Storm Military Operation but 
Also against Houthis,” Global Voice, 11 April 2015, http://globalvoices.checkdesk.org/en/story/ 
292?fbrefresh=1428758657 (accessed 6 January 2015). 
21  Mohamed Hassan, “Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia Silence Anti-War Voices on 
Yemen,” Global Voices, 16 April 2015, https://globalvoices.org/2015/04/16/arab-gulf-
countries-crackdown-on-anti-war-voices-ha s-a-long-history/ (accessed 6 January 2016). 
22  Rori Donaghy, “Police Officer Killed in Security Raids on Saudi Arabia’s Eastern 
Province,” Middle East Eye, 5 April 2015, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/security-forces-
God your absolute victory 
to the mujahidin who are 
bombing the #Houthis in 
#Yemen and the tails of 
Safavis. God save us with 
your shield and guide the 
aim of our soldiers. God 
bring doom to the 
enemies of Sunni  
people everywhere 
Yemen. 
(translated from Arabic) 
KSA is bombing Houthi 
traitors. They betrayed 
Yemen and Muslims 
when they formed an 
alliance with the Iranian 
devil. Oh god help the 
Saudi forces achieve 
victory over the enemies 
of the #Yemeni nation 
(translated from Arabic) 
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Saudi media did not report on the protests, and internationally it was only 
Iranian and Russian news outlets that covered them.23 News of the demon-
strations only found its way onto Twitter through accounts associated with 
the protest movement in Qatif and retweeted by various opponents of the 
Saudi intervention. 
Although absent from the sample, the most outspoken, distinctively 
Shiite, and anti-intervention voices in Arabic on Twitter came from Leba-
non. It was there that the regional power struggle between Saudi Arabia 
and Iran found resonance, and the environment allowed both sides to 
mobilize voices on Twitter without fear of a major crackdown. The inter-
vention in Yemen thus unleashed a debate in Lebanon among political 
leaders and exacerbated tensions between domestic Sunni and Shiite 
political groups.24 
The solidarity extended by Lebanese users was acknowledged and wel-
comed by some in Yemen under the hashtag #sayyid_alyemen ( ﺪﯿﺳ_ﻦﻤﯿﻟا ). 
The hashtag (Sayyid of Yemen) alludes to the Houthi leader Abdulmalik 
al-Houthi, who as a sayyid is a descendent of prophet Muhammad. With 
the hashtag, al-Houthi was immediately connected with Hizballah leader 
Hassan Nasrallah, who is often referred to as Sayyid Hassan. It emerged in 
late April 2015 and created a space for Lebanese supporters of Hizballah, 
and later Yemeni Houthi supporters, to speak out against the war. They 
cursed Saudi Arabia, shared pictures of child victims of Saudi air strikes, 
and expressed their support for the Houthis, cheering them on and ex-
pressing their hope for victory. Saudi Arabia was described as the gateway 
for Western political influence in the region and associated with al-Qaeda 
and the Islamic State. With pictures of Abdulmalik al-Houthi photo-
shopped to appear with Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Syrian 
president Bashar al-Asad, they sought to create a regional Shiite space of 
solidarity. Although Yemeni Zaydis have in the past not strongly identified 
with Shiite groups such as Hizballah, pictures of Nasrallah were, at least in 
that particular moment, used as profile pictures on social media by Yem-
enis to express a form of regional solidarity. 
  
 
raid-saudi-arabias-eastern-province-stop-anti-yemen-war-protests-451186533 (accessed 6 Janu-
ary 2016). 
23  “Bahrain: See Anti-Yemen Airstrike Protesters Turn Streets into Flames,” RT: Ruptly, 4 
April 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ayTrukTerdo (accessed 6 January 2016). 
“Bahrain Forces Fire Tear Gas at Anti-Regime Protesters,” Iran Daily, 5 April 2015, http:// 
www.iran-daily.com/News/114782.html (accessed 6 January 2016). 
24  Interview with a Lebanese Twitter activist, Beirut, April 24, 2015; also see Nour 
Samaha, “Lebanese Factions Battle to Control Yemen Narrative,” Al Jazeera, 18 April 2015, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/lebanese-factions-battle-control-yemen-narrative-
150418074321723.html (accessed 6 January 2016); Esperance Ghanem, “Yemen Dispute 
Could Hurt Lebanon,” Al-Monitor, 30 April 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/ 
2015/04/lebanon-hezbollah-future-movement-dialogue-saudi-yemen.html# (accessed 6 
January 2016). 
Twitter users are calling 
for the arrest of the 
Twitter user Khalid E. 
who criticizes the 
Peninsula Shield Force. 
He did this while 
knowing that Kuwait is 
involved with KSA in 
the operation in Yemen 
against the Houthis?!!! 















































 Time frame: 26 March–9 September 2015. 
 Visualizes retweeting networks of dominant users in different communities  
retweeted between 200 and 6,233 times. 
 Size of nodes: Large nodes indicate that a user has significant influence  
on the entire network, so-called eigenvector centrality. 
Note: The data for this graph was extracted directly using stream API  
keyword: Yemen in English and Arabic). 
Figure 10 
Retweeting Networks of Dominant Users in the Military Intervention Debate 
Twitter Communities by Color 
Dark blue: Arabic-speaking Sunni solidarity space dominated by two Sunni Yemeni accounts 
retweeted by Gulf-based, predominantly Saudi accounts (see p. 50).  
Light blue: English-speaking Indian users, newspapers, and politicians tweeting about Indian 
evacuation operations in Yemen (see p. 54). Dark green: English-speaking anti-Saudi network 
composed of human rights activists and organizations and political analysts (see p. 54).  
Yellow: Arabic pro-Saleh users and media Orange: English-speaking Iranian users (see p. 54). 
Red: Turkish users. Light green: Users tweeting about issues unrelated to Yemen. 
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Nevertheless, when compared to the sheer mass of tweets in support of 
Saudi Arabia, and the massive number of retweets made possible by the 
size of the Saudi Twitter community and bots, voices speaking out against 
the military intervention remained marginal in the Arabic debate. The few 
critical voices in the sample came mostly from Egypt. Viewing the devel-
opments from a domestic perspective and often cynically, Egyptians pointed 
to the alleged hypocrisy of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who had “force-
fully toppled a legitimate president” and now supported the intervention 
in Yemen to supposedly protect the legitimacy of a government that had 
also been forcefully overthrown. Aware of the traumatic experience of the 
Egyptian army in Yemen in the 1960s, many Egyptians opposed their coun-
try’s participation in the intervention. Other critical users, from Egypt and 
the Gulf states, also made reference to hypocritical actions by Saudi Arabia 
and the United States in the region, particularly in regard to Iraq and Pal-
estine, asking for instance, why the Saudis were bombing Muslims in Yemen 
after having done nothing as Israel waged war in Gaza in summer 2014. 
The English Language Sphere: 
Human Rights and Domestic Concerns 
The English-language sphere was more diverse than the Arabic arena in 
terms of nationalities represented as well as themes and was generally 
more outspoken against the war. One transnational English-tweeting net-
work against the war consisted primarily of users from Yemen, the Yemeni 
diaspora in Egypt, the United States, and United Kingdom, and political 
analysts, journalists, and human rights activists and organizations. This 
network positioned itself in general as being against both Saudi Arabia 
and the Houthis. In particular, Human Rights Watch and Oxfam, along 
with Western newspapers (including the Guardian, New York Times, Intercept, 
and Washington Post), informed the discourse within this network. This 
Yemen-focused community was also connected to other dominant Arab 
Twitter users across the Middle East, Europe, and the United States who 
tweeted in English and who opposed the war from a human rights per-
spective, including Egyptian activists who appeared in the sample of users 
tweeting on sexual harassment in Egypt. 
The core of this network promoted an anti-sectarian hashtag  
#KefayaWar (kefaya means “enough” in Arabic) in expressing opposition to 
the Saudi intervention as well as the aggressive expansion of the Houthis 
inside Yemen. Because Yemenis based in the Houthi-controlled capital 
dominated the Yemeni Twitter sphere, the hashtag #KefayaWar was often 
attacked in its initial stages by opponents of the Houthis, often based in 
south Yemen or the diaspora for a pro-Houthi bias.25 This internal north-
 
25  Until 1990, Yemen was divided into two states, North Yemen and South Yemen. Since 
unification, southern Yemenis have felt politically and economically marginalized, which 
resulted in the emergence of a protest movement that began calling for independence in 
2009. With the takeover of Sana’a, the capital, by Houthis in September 2014, and the 
group’s further expansion toward southern Yemen, the north-south divide widened, with 
Look brother how all 
the Gulf is worried 
about Yemen! When the 
American forces tore 
apart Iraq and when they 
killed a million and a half 
Iraqis it was normal. You 
tore apart all principles 
may god curse you. 
(translated from Arabic) 
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south Yemeni and pro- and anti-Houthi divide was reflected in the trans-
national network, with some activists, journalists, analysts and diaspora 
communities being obviously more sympathetic toward the north and 
others toward the south. Those associating closely with the north were 
more outspoken against the Saudi intervention than those associating 
with the south, where the Houthis were aggressively expanding and the 
Saudi intervention was widely supported. To counter the more dominant 
and anti-Saudi voices in the transnational network speaking out against 
the intervention, Yemeni activists launched the hashtag #HouthiCrimes to 
give space to the anti-Houthi discourse in the English-language sphere. 
A number of other national networks, largely isolated from each other, 
viewed the intervention through their own domestic lenses. In India, users 
began tweeting about the intervention in relation to the Indian military’s 
large-scale evacuation of Indian nationals and others from the Gulf. In 
early April 2015, India had transported 4,640 Indians as well as some 1,000 
nationals from 41 other countries (see Figure 10, p. 52, light blue network). 
In Pakistan, users tweeted about Yemen in terms of whether Pakistan 
should militarily support the intervention, with most users positioning 
themselves against the intervention. The opposition leader Imran Khan 
also took to Twitter to voice his rejection of direct Pakistani participation 
in the Yemeni war and was later reported to have claimed credit for the 
unanimous parliamentary vote against intervening.26 In the United States, 
the conflict was viewed in the context of the war on terror. Given that 
President Barack Obama had frequently praised Yemen as a model for its 
counter-terrorism strategy, Twitter users pointed to the failure of the 
strategy and questioned, often sarcastically, how Yemen could be such a 
model given its state of crisis. 
Among Iranians who participated in the debate, one popular retweet 
was that of a Fox News interview with Maryam Rajavi, from the National 
Council of Resistance of Iran, in which she spoke of the destabilizing role 
of Iran in the region in light of the intervention in Yemen. It was shared 
hundreds of times by Iranians in Iran and in the diaspora. Many propo-
nents of the tweet declared regime change in Iran to be their explicit goal 
(see Figure 10, p. 52, orange network). 
Regional Solidarity, Domestic Prism: 
Fault Lines, Sectarian Spaces, and Media Manipulation 
The debate on the Saudi-led intervention exemplifies the dynamics of global 
debates on Twitter. First, the dominant frame of reference was a domestic 
one. Twitter users were embedded in Twitter networks from within which 
they viewed events through their respective domestic prism even when 
 
the line between Houthi supporters and Houthi opponents generally running through 
central Yemen. 
26  “Neutrality in War: Imran Takes Credit for Parliament’s Verdict on Yemen,” Express 
Tribune, 12 April 2015, http://tribune.com.pk/story/868550/neutrality-in-war-imran-takes-
credit-for-parliaments-verdict-on -yemen/ (accessed 6 January 2016). 
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events occurred elsewhere. These prisms were determined by their govern-
ment’s or society’s historical and political involvement or position vis-à-vis 
the event. This explains, for instance, the particular positions taken by 
Americans, Indians, and Egyptians in the debate. 
At the same time, Twitter served as an infrastructure for users to con-
nect with like-minded people, thus enabling the emergence of spaces of 
solidarity and transnational networks. In the MENA region, rather than a 
unified Arab space of solidarity — with the exception of a small regional 
network of human rights activists — the solidarity spaces followed sec-
tarian and political lines. 
The debate also showed how certain voices can dominate a discourse 
either through overwhelming representation on Twitter or through ma-
nipulation (such as bots and crackdowns on freedom of speech) and how 
Twitter debates can be instrumentalized to legitimize foreign policy, as 
with the Saudi intervention. The opinions expressed in the Arabic-lan-
guage sample largely reflected that of the traditional media in the Gulf 
states. Traditional media outlets in Saudi Arabia also used the Twitter 
debates as an indication of popular support for the military intervention.27 
While the support expressed in Saudi traditional and social media could 
be interpreted as indicative of genuine support for the intervention, it 
must also be viewed against the backdrop of Saudi Arabia’s media strategy, 
which was to ensure that its own narrative of the war dominated the 
media discourse in Yemen and internationally.28 Al-Arabiya, for instance, 
consistently reported on the war from the Saudi government’s perspective. 
The Saudi channel devoted an overwhelming amount of airtime to the 
war, providing details of battles and emphasizing the coalition’s progress. 
Many Twitter users picked up news from al-Arabiya and spread it, thereby 
amplifying traditional media’s impact. 
Of interest, some users in the Arabic sample made explicit reference to 
the way the media were being manipulated for the interest of political 
actors, but only mentioned Houthi and Iranian media. Some tweets 
demanded that these media outlets be dismantled by the Saudi military, 
along with Houthi military targets. This perspective, among others, shows 
how the media came to be viewed as actors in their own right in the con-
flict, rather than as neutral observers. 
 
27  “Opinions ‘Storm’ Twitter in Support of Military Operation,” Arab News, 30 March 
2015, http://www.arabnews.com/science-technology/news/725246?quicktabs_stat2=1 (ac-
cessed 6 January 2016). Al-Arabiya published a piece about Yemeni expatriates in Saudi 
Arabia who supported the intervention and praised the relationship between Saudi 
Arabia and Yemen. See “Yemeni Expatriates in Saudi Arabia Slam Houthi Rebels on Twit-
ter,” Al-Arabiya, 1 April 2015, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/media/digital/2015/04/01/ 
Yemeni-expatriates-slam-Houthi-rebels-on-Twitter.html (accessed 6 January 2016). 
28  See Steve Metcalf, “Saudi Arabia Winning Yemeni Media War,” BBC, 27 May 2015, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/monitoring/saudi-arabia-winning-yemeni-media-war (accessed 6 Janu-
ary 2016); Lee Fang, “Inside Saudi Arabia’s Campaign to Charm American Policymakers 
and Journalists,” Intercept, 1 December 2015, https://theintercept.com/2015/12/01/inside-
saudi-charm-campaign/ (accessed 6 January 2016). 
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Beyond the Individual Twitter Debate 
Mareike Transfeld and Isabelle Werenfels 
The Twitter debates on sexual harassment, fracking, and military interven-
tion display a number of striking similarities despite their variance in con-
tent, size, and connection to specific social, political, local, and subregion-
al contexts. Together with evidence from interviews with Twitter users 
across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, as well as insights 
into a number of other local debates, they allow for more general conclu-
sions about Twitter debates ignited by events in the Arab world. 
Patterns of Debates and Networks 
Assessment of the case study debates and resulting networks revealed pat-
terns concerning the prevalence of national frames of reference, polariza-
tion and identity politics, the importance of language and history in the 
geography of debate, and the paradox of combining elitism and a breadth 
of content. 
 
National frames of reference. It is quite paradoxical that given Twitter’s 
supranational character, the main frame of reference of the respective 
Twitter communities engaging in the debates examined was strongly 
national. The three case studies all involve regional, interregional, and 
global participation and scopes of debate around local events. A 2009 study 
on the Arabic blogosphere showed that most bloggers focus on domestic 
topics, with only the issue of Palestine uniting the entire network.1 A few 
years on, the dynamics on Twitter are similar. The primary interest of the 
debates analyzed was revealed to be domestic. Whenever topics were 
picked up in another national context, they were reframed locally. For 
instance, the Tahrir Square rape incident served as a point of departure in 
other Arab countries for their own domestic debates with a different em-
phasis.2 Lebanese Twitter users reframed the Saudi military operation in 
 
1  Bruce Etling et al., Mapping the Arabic Blogosphere: Politics, Culture and Dissent (Berkman 
Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University, 16 June 2009), https://cyber.law. 
harvard.edu/publications/2009/Mapping_the_Arabic_Blogosphere. 
2  This dynamic was explained in the following way by a Tunisian influencer interviewed 
in Tunis in April 2015: “In Tunisia, there was an immediate reaction of disgust and of 
‘Our society is different’. But Tunisian activists on Twitter used the Egyptian cases to 
point out that we too have a problem with sexual harassment.” Analysis of the spread of 
anti-sexism hashtags in MENA as well as other contexts shows how defining domestic 
frames of reference remain not only due to the language barrier and how difficult it is to 
break through them. See for instance, Anna Antonakis-Nashif, “Hashtagging the Invisible: 
Bringing Private Experiences into Public Debate. An #outcry against Sexism in Germany” 
in #HashtagPublics: The Power and Politics of Discursive Networks, ed. Nathan Rambukkana (New 
York: Peter Lang, 2016), 101–14. 
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Yemen to proclaim their local sectarian loyalties. Egyptians used the inter-
vention to point to their president’s hypocrisy, and environmentalists 
from across the globe drew on the fracking protests in Algeria to advance 
their specific domestic struggles against shale gas drilling. 
The case studies also show that Twitter debates spread only when an 
issue resonates in a local context. Efforts by Egyptian and Tunisian users to 
trigger local anti-fracking dynamics failed. Even fertile soil, however, may 
not help to broaden Twitter debates beyond national borders. For instance, 
a 2013 Moroccan debate over the use of dialect versus Standard Arabic in 
the educational system was barely noticed by other Maghrebi Twitter com-
munities or in Lebanon, despite the use of dialect being controversial there 
as well. In addition, a 2015 Algerian Twitter debate on dialect was ignored 
by the other Maghrebi Twitter communities.3 The tendency toward 
national Twitter spaces is perfectly illustrated by the emerging Moroccan 
Twitter community calling itself La Twittoma.4 
 
Polarization and identity politics. Twitter did not serve to iron out the political 
or social rifts in the three case studies, and if anything, it sharpened them, 
at least rhetorically. Twitter’s truncated format encourages pointed state-
ments, so less restraint is exercised than in traditional media formats. In 
the case studies, Twitter thus tended to amplify simplistic notions of the 
“other” and the “enemy.” In Algeria, the Twitter debate rhetorically cement-
ed the gap between the “regime” and the “population.” The Saudi and 
Egyptian debates were ultimately examples of identity politics. 
When Twitter served to build bridges, it did so primarily between the 
potentially like-minded. For instance, in Algeria it enhanced solidarities 
between different marginalized communities as well as between activists 
at the country’s center and on its periphery. Twitter also constituted an 
important platform for interaction and the exchange of information for 
anti-sexual harassment and human rights activists from the Middle East, 
Africa, and the West. Such non-sectarian digital solidarities tend, however, 
to be less visible than sectarian solidarities, or they provoke strong 
counter-reactions by sectarian or ideological camps promoting different 
values and thus also reinforce fault lines. The main trend was that Twitter 
united sectarian, ethnic, religious, and other ideology or value-based com-
munities across the Middle East and beyond and pitted them against one 
other.5 For instance, Shiite communities came together in solidarity against 
the Saudi-led, Sunni attack on the Houthis and vice versa. 
 
3  The authors would like to thank Lina Najmi, who traced and analyzed the Moroccan 
Darija debate. 
4  The Twittoma — the “ma” is from Morocco’s country abbreviation — emerged from the 
Moroccan blogosphere. For an account by one of the most active Twittoma members, see 
Marouane Harmach, “Radioscopie (subjective) de la twittoma,” 8 July 2011, http://sniper. 
ma/radioscopie-subjective-de-la-twittoma/. 
5  See Felix Stalder, Digital Solidarity, Mute and the Post-Media Lab, 2013, p. 14, http:// 
www.metamute.org/sites/www.metamute.org/files/u1/Digital-Solidarity-Felix-Stalder-9781 
906496920-web-fullbook.pdf (accessed 17 February 2016). 
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In the MENA region, what might initially appear to be a single-issue 
Twitter debate, such as fracking, can immediately become politicized and 
ideologically loaded, revealing historical traumas in local societies, con-
temporary political fault lines, and conflict-ridden negotiations of identity. 
In short, on Twitter, as shown in the case studies, “real world” conflicts are 
not only present, but are reproduced and often reinforced. It is simplistic 
and misleading to view Twitter as constituting an autonomous digital 
space following a different logic from that of the physical world. 
 
Language and history in the geography of debate. The three debates analyzed 
provide no evidence of an “Arab public sphere” on Twitter, nor do they 
point to the subregional entities that policy makers tend to use as points of 
reference, such as the Maghreb, North Africa, and the Gulf. Rather lan-
guage and local historical experiences played key roles in shaping the Twit-
ter networks forged around the debates. 
Twitter communities formed within the boundaries of the different lan-
guages used: Arabic, English, and French as well as local dialects. Networks 
about a particular subject split into different language spheres, with certain 
individuals acting as bridges between the spheres.6 Within these spheres, 
debates on the same topic often went in different directions. In Arabic, the 
Saudi-Yemeni debate displayed a cruder, more nationalist, sectarian, and 
pro-Saudi tone than the English debate, which was more nuanced and 
more anti-interventionist. The Algerian anti-fracking debate in French was 
more geared toward mobilizing and was more outspokenly anti-govern-
ment than the debate in Arabic. In some cases, the topic defined the main 
language used. For instance, English tended to be the primary Twitter lan-
guage for civil liberties and human rights discourses, such as the humani-
tarian dimension of the Saudi military operation in Yemen. 
Not surprisingly, the language used also affected the geographic con-
tours of a network. English debates had the broadest and most global 
scope. Debates resonating across the MENA region also tended to be in Eng-
lish. French debates on issues concerning the Maghreb revealed a strong 
vertical, north-south dimension, between France and individual Maghreb 
countries, rather than horizontal, pan-Maghrebi or pan-Arab networks. 
Debates in local dialects spread beyond a subregion only when a signifi-
cant diaspora community existed. 
Beyond language and the size of a Twitter community, local social and 
political history played a role in forging digital networks. These histories, 
including labor and other migrations of Arab and Asian communities, led 
to fault lines and polarizations. The consequences are reflected in the con-
tours of the Twitter networks formed. They explain why the Gulf as repre-
sented on Twitter is not the geographic Gulf, but primarily a Sunni Gulf. 
They also explain why France plays such an important role in Maghrebi 
debates and why there is a certain disconnect between the Maghreb and 
 
6  Axel Bruns, Tim Highfield, and Jean Burgess, “The Arab Spring and Social Media 
Audiences: English and Arabic Twitter Users and Their Networks,” American Behavioral 
Scientist 57, no. 7 (2013): 871–98. 
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the rest of the Arab world. In other words, developments in the physical 
world are largely responsible for the contours of cyber networks. 
 
Elitism and breadth. Analysis of influencers in the three debates indicates 
that Twitter agenda setters in the MENA region are an elitist group of 
youngish, well-educated, multilingual, and tech-savvy citizens. In the 
Saudi case, they consist of influential public figures, for example, well-
known clerics. This appears to support the argument made in some studies 
of information and communication technologies that pre-internet status 
hierarchies are reinforced or adapted in cyberspace.7 
Nevertheless, the three case study debates also pointed to a blurring of 
hierarchies via Twitter. Journalists from a breadth of media increasingly 
relied on Twitter sources, which allowed many non-elite voices to be 
heard.8 Twitter thus enabled a greater breadth of opinions to be voiced 
than the debates through traditional media with the state looking over 
their shoulder. Even in Saudi Arabia, Twitter is a freer space than tradi-
tional media. Moreover, on Twitter, social hierarchies — between classes, 
men and women, center and periphery, and ethnic and religious majori-
ties and minorities — appeared to matter far less than they do in “everyday 
life.” Twitter users had very different professional and geographic back-
grounds, including places with no national media let alone international 
correspondents. On Twitter, “ordinary people” with internet access directly 
expressed their opinions; a young female civil society activist from a cul-
turally or politically marginalized social group in the geographic periphery 
could have more international followers and a stronger voice in a debate 
than a minister sitting in the capital. In some cases, Twitter thus provided 
the “subaltern” with a voice in the public debate.9 
In other words, through Twitter, the elitism of influencers is also accom-
panied by a breadth of content. Regardless of what percentage of society is 
actively represented on Twitter, the spectrum of actors and opinions from 
the Arab world directly or indirectly present on Twitter is broader than in 
traditional media. 
 
7  Philip N. Howard et al., “Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of Social Media 
during the Arab Spring?,” Project on Information Technology and Political Islam, Univer-
sity of Washington, 2011. 
8  Alfred Hermida et al. “Sourcing the Arab Spring: A Case Study of Andy Carvin’s Sources 
on Twitter during the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions,” Journal of Computer-Mediated 
Communication, 2013, p. 8, http://alfredhermida.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/04/Sourcing_ 
the_Arab_Spring_preprint_version_-_Hermida_et_al._2013.pdf. 
9  The term subaltern has notably been used in post-colonial studies to describe socially, 
culturally, and politically oppressed groups outside the dominant (hegemonic) power 
structures. 
Beyond the Individual Twitter Debate 
SWP Berlin 
Twitter Debates and Networks  




From Space for Oppositional Activism to Tool of 
Authoritarian Hegemons? 
Although it is tempting to view this study’s findings in terms of pro-
liberties and political reform impacts, the three case studies also point to 
important tendencies in the opposite direction. 
 
Mobilizing, participating, connecting. Twitter’s most frequently cited function 
— to mobilize emotionally and physically — can be seen in all three 
debates. In the case of sexual harassment in Egypt, Twitter helped provoke 
public outcry and pressured politicians to take (symbolic) action against 
harassment. In the Egyptian and Algerian debates, Twitter also served to 
hook up individual activists and groups within national borders and 
beyond. In the Saudi case, however, mobilization meant enhancing sec-
tarian and religious fault lines and encouraging violence. 
 
Triggering, magnifying, amplifying. With the partial exception of the Tahrir 
rape incident, Twitter did not trigger the debates discussed, but in all 
three cases, Twitter served to magnify the triggering event. In Egypt, the 
debate on sexual harassment sparked in June 2014 would not have taken 
place without social media, including and centrally Twitter, quickly and 
widely spreading the rape video. In the Algerian fracking case, the local 
Twitter community and international media did not act as two separate 
spheres, but bounced off one another to amplify and internationalize the 
issue. In the Saudi intervention, Twitter amplified voices from Yemen, 
such as through the hashtag #KefayaWar. In this case it was particularly 
the nature of followers — local and international media, foreign officials, 
large organizations — more than the numbers that defined a local user’s 
capacity to amplify an event. In the Saudi-Yemeni case, particularly in the 
Arabic-language sphere, Twitter did not amplify moderate or marginal 
voices, but primarily Saudi government positions, thus giving the regional 
hegemon discourse hegemony in the Twitter debate. 
 
Naming and shaming. Twitter’s potential to generate significant nuisance 
power by naming and shaming public figures or previously unknown indi-
viduals was demonstrated in the Egyptian sexual harassment debate. Also, 
in the Algerian fracking debate, the multinational Total, fearing reputa-
tional damage, found itself compelled to deny via Twitter the many tweets 
accusing it of fracking in In Salah. In this case, naming and shaming 
missed its target. This points to the problem that Twitter also permits the 
accidental or deliberate targeting of innocent actors. 
 
Informing and disinformation. Twitter allows journalists to access information 
from a broad spectrum of sources, with non-elite sources and counter-
publics having equal chances at representation. It would be naïve, how-
ever, to assume that (from a Western perspective) only liberal, democratic, 
or factually correct information is being spread. The Saudi debate showed 
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the vast opportunities Twitter offers for those deliberately spreading ma-
nipulated or inciting information. 
 
Which functions and which actors prevail on Twitter depends on the local 
context. The analysis of the cases in this study, as well as information 
gathered from interviews and the literature, suggests that the smaller and 
less evolved a Twitter scene is in a MENA country, the more dominant the 
civil society activists and voices critical of the status quo. This was the case 
in the early stages of Twitter in Saudi and Egypt. It is still the case in 
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and at least prior to the Saudi intervention, in 
Yemen. As Twitter communities become more visible in local social and 
political contexts, efforts by government to curtail their freedoms increase. 
This is currently the situation in Egypt, where on top of a repressive regime, 
a polarized society is also contributing to marginalizing moderate, pro-
human rights and democracy voices. In Saudi Arabia and other Gulf coun-
tries, conservative actors dominate the Twittersphere in numbers and im-
pact, and the prosecution of critical Twitter voices is diligent and on the 
rise. Clearly, the scope and pervasiveness of crackdowns on Twitter depend 
not only on the evolution of the internet or social media, but also on the 
general degree of repressiveness of the particular authoritarian system. 
Yet, and somewhat paradoxically, Twitter’s political relevance is possibly 
highest in strongly repressive contexts, like Egypt and Saudi, because 
Twitter freedoms are more restricted there than elsewhere, but substan-
tially greater than for other media. In other words, the more repressive a 
context, the more important Twitter becomes, because it constitutes a 
freer space than the muted local media. The territories controlled by the 
Islamic State are a case in point. For example, the Twitter account of the 
collective called Raqqa Is Silently Being Slaughtered has assumed a critical 
role in providing information in real time from the IS-controlled town in 
Syria. Many of the collective’s members have paid with their lives for their 
online activities. 
Lessons To Be Learned 
European governments, politicians, and diplomats were absent from the 
Twitter debates analyzed for this study. When they appeared in other 
MENA Twitter contexts, it usually involved tweets informing about domes-
tic developments or cooperation with, aid to, or a visit to a MENA country. 
This low-key involvement is commendable, because using Twitter as a tool 
to promote certain contents or policies requires a profound understanding 
of local contexts, and even then, it can be difficult to predict how a debate 
on a certain topic will evolve. 
There are, however, a number of important lessons that European policy 
makers could learn from these case studies. First, Twitter is neither a reli-
able early warning system for the next “revolution,” nor is it likely to un-
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leash what some call “democracy’s fourth wave” in the MENA region.10 It is 
nevertheless a seismograph for tensions, fault lines, grievances, and visions 
of transformation in these societies. It also constitutes a window onto 
dreams and traumas of Arab societies. By following important agenda 
setters on Twitter, policy makers can gain access to the diversity of these 
societies and learn about the concerns of social segments only marginally 
represented in the local media or entirely absent. European policy makers 
can also take note of the increasing role and impact of diaspora communi-
ties on Twitter debates in their country of origin. 
Second, the cases in this study show how defining domestic politics, 
local social developments, and history are to the dynamics of Twitter 
debates. They demonstrate how language matters to the geography and 
scope of a debate as well as the way an issue is discussed, and they illus-
trate that Twitter can deepen rather than smooth fault lines. Tweets are 
always understood, interpreted, and reframed from a local perspective. 
This knowledge does not provide policy makers any certainty on the dif-
fusion of Twitter messages, but it can give them an idea of where, how, 
and by whom tweets will be received and forwarded. 
Finally, this study reveals the tendency of Twitter, as it evolves in local 
contexts, to move from a space dominated by those promoting civil and 
political liberties to an instrument for those promoting radical ideologies, 
identity politics, and authoritarian regime control. In both cases of pro-
moting human rights and spreading radical ideas, “ordinary people” can 
be driving forces next to media personalities, journalists, and leading poli-
ticians. Twitter’s role not only varies according to the local context, but its 
effects are highly ambivalent as well. The cases in this study show that the 
processes of radicalization and polarization through Twitter can pose a 
threat to local social cohesion and fuel violent local and regional conflict. 
For that reason, European policy makers should support research into 
these dynamics, in particular on how Twitter as an infrastructure for 
debate contributes to radicalization and polarization.11 
On the other hand, Twitter in the MENA region remains one of the freest 
spaces for expression. The upholding and promoting of internet freedoms 
through international regulations and bodies thus is vital. If European 
policy makers do not pursue this, they risk contributing to the substantial 
curbing of the freedoms that Moroccan, Algerian, Tunisian, Lebanese, Yem-
eni, and other Twitter communities in the region still enjoy — at least for 
the moment. 
 
10  Philip N. Howard and Muzammil M. Hussain, Democracy’s Fourth Wave? Digital Media and 
the Arab Spring (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
11  See, for instance, Hossein Derakhshan, “How Facebook Unwillingly Helps ISIS,” Daily 
Dot, 9 February 2016, http://www.dailydot.com/opinion/how-facebook-unwillingly-helps-
isis/ (accessed 17 February 2016). 
